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POVERTY, "MEANINGFUL" EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY, AND THE NECESSARY ROLE
OF THE COURTS
MICHAEL A. REBELL*
Through state standards-based education reform initiatives and the
Federal No Child Left Behind Act, the United States has made an
unprecedented and extraordinary commitment to ensuring that all
children will meet challenging academic proficiency standards. To
date, however, little progress has been made toward meeting this
ambitious mandate, largely because state and federal educational
policies fail to deal with the enormous impediments to learning that
are posed by the conditions of poverty in which millions of school
children live. This Article argues for a commitment to "meaningful
educational opportunity" that, in essence, would require school
districts and local public and nonprofit agencies to provide a
comprehensive range of specific in-school and coordinated out-of-
school services to children from backgrounds of concentrated
poverty. The Article finds support for its theory of meaningful
educational opportunity in federal equal educational opportunity
laws and court decisions and in the state education adequacy cases.
It further contends that the needed reforms, which are feasible and
affordable, cannot be achieved without the continued and expanded
involvement of the courts in enforcing constitutional requirements
for educational opportunity and educational adequacy, and that
through a functional model of effective collaboration between the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, the
nation's challenging educational objectives can actually be attained.
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Il1), 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006). The author would like to thank Holly Prozzo for research
assistance with Part I of this Article, Joseph J. Wardenski and Kim Zachary for research
assistance with Part II, and Molly Hunter, Allyson Pierce, and Jessica Wolff for their
valuable comments and editing suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
"All children can learn" is the fundamental premise of the
standards-based reforms adopted over the past decade in forty-nine
of the fifty states.' Furthermore, the federal government has
mandated that all children must "meet or exceed the State's
proficient level of academic achievement ... [on] challenging
academic content standards and challenging student academic
achievement standards" by 2014.2 Given the enormous deficits in the
current academic functioning levels of most poor and minority
1. "All children can learn; and we can change our system of public elementary,
middle, and secondary education to ensure that all children do learn at world-class levels."
N.Y. STATE BD. OF REGENTS, ALL CHILDREN CAN LEARN: A PLAN FOR REFORM OF
STATE AID TO SCHOOLS 1 (1993) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). For
general descriptions of the standards-based reform approach, see generally DESIGNING
COHERENT EDUCATION POLICY: IMPROVING THE SYSTEM (Susan H. Fuhrman ed.,
1993); ROBERT ROTHMAN, MEASURING UP: STANDARDS, ASSESSMENT, AND SCHOOL
REFORM (1995); MARC S. TUCKER & JUDY B. CODDING, STANDARDS FOR OUR
SCHOOLS: HOW TO SET THEM, MEASURE THEM, AND REACH THEM 40-43 (1998).
2. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 101, 115 Stat. 1425,
1444-45, 1448 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
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students,3 this national commitment to significant educational
opportunity for all students-a commitment grounded in a realization
that economic competitiveness in a global economy and effective
functioning of a democratic society in the twenty-first century require
a well-educated citizenry-cannot be met without sustained efforts by
all three branches of government, including the courts. This Article
analyzes the challenges posed by America's unprecedented
commitment to ensuring that all children are educated to high levels
and sets forth an approach for actually realizing this goal by providing
"meaningful" educational opportunities for all children.
Part I begins with a review of the enormous impediments to
learning that are posed by the conditions of poverty and a discussion
of the need for a comprehensive approach to overcome them. Such
an approach must respond not only to the need for improved
instructional opportunities in the classroom, but also to the health,
nutrition, housing, family support, and other out-of-school factors
that directly impede a child's readiness to learn. Part II discusses the
ironic reality that the educational finance systems in most states,
instead of providing these students more resources to overcome these
severe deficits, actually provide them less. Insult is added to the
injury being perpetrated on these students by the argument advanced
by some critics of judicial efforts to rectify these inequities that
"money doesn't matter" in overcoming educational disadvantages.
The virtually unanimous findings of researchers and of the numerous
courts that have recently reviewed this issue strongly repudiate that
proposition.
Part III considers the implications of the uneven history of the
implementation of the egalitarian vision that was articulated by the
United States Supreme Court more than fifty years ago in Brown v.
Board of Education.' Brown articulated a new concept of equal
educational opportunity and initiated a new era of commitment to
equity goals as an ongoing policy commitment of the federal and state
governments. Although the history of implementation of equal
educational opportunity by the federal courts and the Congress since
Brown has been a saga of major advances and significant retreats,
overall, an important egalitarian dynamic in the American political
culture has been maintained and extended in recent years. This is
reflected in both the state court decisions requiring "adequate"
educational opportunities for all children and the national
3. See infra Part I.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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commitment to ensuring that all children have a "fair, equal, and
significant opportunity"5 to become proficient in rigorous state
academic standards that is set forth in the Federal No Child Left
Behind Act ("NCLB").6
Part IV argues that in order to achieve sustained progress toward
the national egalitarian goals and to substantially narrow or eliminate
achievement gaps, a consistent and coherent concept of "significant"
or "meaningful" educational opportunity must be adopted. A
commitment to "meaningful" educational opportunity would require
making substantial revisions to NCLB, providing a comprehensive
range of specific in-school and out-of-school services to children from
backgrounds of concentrated poverty, developing new approaches to
questions of feasibility and accountability, countering the trends
toward widening the income gaps between "haves" and "have nots"
in society as a whole, and, at some stage, putting the issue of fully
implementing school desegregation back on the table.
A "meaningful" educational opportunity for all children cannot
be achieved, however, without the continued and expanded
involvement of the courts in educational policy matters. This is the
subject of Part V. The state courts' insistence in contemporary
education finance and education adequacy cases that states provide
adequate resources and meaningful opportunities for all children has
been met with charges of "judicial activism"7 in some quarters. These
allegations of judicial usurpation and judicial incompetence, which
stem from political opposition to the desegregation decrees of the
1960s and 1970s, have little doctrinal or empirical substance. Many of
these criticisms have in recent years essentially been mooted by
legislative decisions to authorize and even to require additional
judicial involvement in education and other areas of social policy.'
Moreover, empirical analyses have demonstrated that the courts have
proved capable of evaluating complex social science evidence and of
formulating effective remedial decrees.
Detractors of judicial intervention claim that the there is " 'scant
evidence' of any success in improving student academic performance"
following court interventions.9 At the same time, however, they
5. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (emphasis added).
6. Id. § 6311.
7. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
9. Williamson M. Evers & Paul Clopton, High-Spending, Low-Performing School
Districts, in COURTING FAILURE: How SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITS EXPLOIT JUDGES'
1470 [Vol. 85
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acknowledge that "there is no denying that the political branches, for
all their rhetoric, have not succeeded in solving our educational
shortcomings after decades of effort."'" Thus, they fault the courts for
not instantly solving complex educational and social problems that
have eluded solutions by the other branches of government for
decades.
The appropriate way to understand the important and necessary
role that courts should play in remedying inequities in education is
through comparative institutional analysis. This approach considers
how the courts, legislatures, and executive agencies, acting
collaboratively, can determine not only what level of spending is
necessary, but also how these funds should effectively be spent in
order to ensure meaningful educational opportunities and thereby
achieve the nation's ambitious but essential goal of ensuring that all
children are educated to high levels.
I. IMPEDIMENTS TO LEARNING CREATED BY THE CONDITIONS OF
POVERTY
In 2005, at least thirty-seven million people in the United States
lived in poverty." This represents 12.6% of the population. 2 The
poverty rate for blacks and Hispanics, however, was almost twice as
high, amounting to 24.9% and 21.8%, respectively. 3 Between one-
fourth and one-third of African-American families with children
(28%) and nearly one in three Latino families with children (31%)
experienced either overcrowded housing, hunger, or lack of medical
care-the three struggles most associated with poverty.
14
The United States has the highest rate of childhood poverty
among the affluent nations in the world. 5 The rate of childhood
GOOD INTENTIONS AND HARM OUR CHILDREN 103, 105 (Eric A. Hanushek ed., 2006)
[hereinafter COURTING FAILURE].
10. Eric A. Hanushek, Introduction to COURTING FAILURE, supra note 9, at xiii, xix.
11. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2005, at 13 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. ARLOC SHERMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, AFRICAN
AMERICAN AND LATINO FAMILIES FACE HIGH RATES OF HARDSHIP 1-2 (2006),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/ll-21-06pov.pdf. The Latino family percentage assumes
the family is headed by a Latino citizen; the rate is even higher (47%) for Latino families
headed by a non-citizen. Id.
15. David C. Berliner, Our Impoverished View of Educational Research, 108 TCHRS.
C. REC. 949, 956-61 (2006) (discussing the extent and permanence of poverty in America
compared to other nations).
2007] 1471
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
poverty in America is 21.9%, compared with less than 3% in
Denmark and Finland, the countries with the lowest rates among the
rich countries in the world. 6 The United States also leads the
industrialized world in the percentage of its population that is
permanently poor (14.5%), an indication that, "[u]nlike other wealthy
countries, we have few mechanisms to get people out of poverty once
they fall in to poverty.
17
This poverty rate among children, of course, is not random but is
"unequally distributed across the many racial and ethnic groups that
make up the American nation."18 Furthermore, these figures most
likely minimize the actual incidence of childhood poverty in America,
since the poverty threshold established at the outset of the "War on
Poverty" in 1969 was set at "three times the cost of a nutritionally
adequate diet" and has not been changed since, despite major
lifestyle changes and resulting proportionate cost increases in areas
such as child care and health care.19
The impact of poverty on children's readiness for learning is
profound. Children from low-income households are more likely to
have severe vision impairments, hearing problems, untreated cavities,
exposure to lead dust and poisoning, and/or asthma, all of which
affect their ability to learn.20  For example, "[c]hildren with vision
problems have difficulty reading and seeing what teachers write on
the board,"'z and "asthma keeps children up at night, and, if they do
make it to school the next day, they are likely to be drowsy and less
attentive."2 Influences during pregnancy also affect children from
16. Childhood poverty rates in other countries include: France, 7.5%; Germany,
10.2%; Canada, 14.9%; United Kingdom, 15.4%; Ireland, 15.7%; and Mexico, 27.7%.
UNICEF INNOCENTI RESEARCH CTR., REPORT CARD No. 6, CHILD POVERTY IN RICH
COUNTRIES 2005, at 4 (2005), available at http://www.unicef.org/brazil/repcard6e.pdf.
17. Berliner, supra note 15, at 960.
18. Id. at 958.
19. UNICEF INNOCENTI RESEARCH CTR., supra note 16, at 19.
20. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS 37-42 (2004); see also Jeanne
Brooks-Gunn & Greg J. Duncan, The Effects of Poverty on Children, FUTURE OF CHILD.,
Summer/Fall 1997, at 55 (summarizing studies of the effects of long-term poverty on
children's welfare and cognitive abilities); Whitney C. Allgood, The Need for Adequate
Resources for At-Risk Children (Econ. Policy Inst., Working Paper No. 277, 2006),
available at http://www.epinet.org/workingpapers/wp277.pdf (comprehensively reviewing
studies and literature on the impact of poverty on children's readiness to learn and setting
forth a "model for determining the components and costs of an adequate education for at-
risk students").
21. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 20, at 37.
22. Id. at 40. "Low-income children with asthma are about 80% more likely than
middle-class children with asthma to miss more than seven days of school a year from the
1472 [Vol. 85
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poverty backgrounds. Their mothers are more likely to partake in
harmful prenatal behaviors such as binge drinking and smoking,
which cause babies to be born prematurely or with low birth
weights.2 3 "[L]ow-birth-weight babies, on average, have lower I.Q.
scores and are more likely to have mild learning disabilities and
attention disorders."24
Lack of food, lack of adequate housing, and residential mobility
also affect children's performance in school. In 2002, not less than
"2% of children from low-income families seem to have experienced
real hunger at some time in the year. "25 Inadequate housing often
deprives children of quiet study space and contributes to frequent
moves and, therefore, a high mobility rate for lower-class children. A
government report in 1994 indicated that 30% of the poorest children
(household incomes less than $10,000) had attended at least three
different schools upon entering the third grade.26
Most black and Latino students in the United States attend
schools that are de facto segregated. In 2000, over 70% of all black
and Latino students attended predominantly minority schools, a
higher percentage than thirty years earlier. 27  "Latino and Black
students comprise 80% of the student population in extreme poverty
schools (90 to 100% poor), 28 and more than 60% of black and Latino
students attend high-poverty schools, compared with 18% of white
students.29
disease.... Drowsy and more irritable, they also have more behavioral problems that
depress achievement." Id.
23. Id. at 43.
24. Id.; see also Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, supra note 20, at 57-60 (describing the
higher frequency of low-birth-weight babies to mothers below the federal poverty line and
the effects on the children).
25. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 20, at 44.
26. Id. A large number of black and Hispanic parents do not have high school
diplomas, a factor that affects their ability to provide academic support to their children.
Minority children also often enter school experiencing lowered expectations and damaging
stereotypes, and often must deal with a curriculum that does not draw upon their own
cultural experiences. Edmund W. Gordon & Beatrice L. Bridglall, The Challenge,
Context, and Preconditions of Academic Development at High Levels, in SUPPLEMENTARY
EDUCATION 10, 15 (Edmund W. Gordon et al. eds., 2005).
27. ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., A
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM?
28 (2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWe
LosingtheDream.pdf.
28. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV.,
WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY, 21 (2005),
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Why-Segreg
_Matters.pdf.
29, Id. at 18 (defining high-poverty schools as those with 50 to 100% poor students).
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The "achievement gap" results directly from the fact that high
proportions of African-American and Latino students live in
conditions of poverty and that by and large they attend segregated
schools.3" Looking at the national performance averages on the
National Assessment of Educational Progress ("NAEP") in recent
years, the scores of white students continuously remain in the sixtieth
percentile for both fourth and eighth grades in all subjects, while
black student scores remain on average in the thirtieth percentile.31
In 1998, the national graduation rate of white students was 78%,
significantly higher than African-American students (56%) and
Latino students (54 %).32
The impact of these poverty conditions and of low academic
achievement upon the life chances of millions of low-income and
minority children is stark. Whereas thirty years ago a high school
dropout earned about 64% of the amount earned by a diploma
recipient, in 2004, he or she would earn only 37% of the graduate's
amount.33 Nor is this an issue of concern only to the affected
30. Conditions of concentrated poverty compound the impediments to learning
experienced by students with socioeconomic disadvantages. See James E. Ryan, Schools,
Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 284-96 (1999) (providing an overview of research
and commentary on the impact of concentrated poverty); see also Russell W. Rumberger,
Parsing the Data on Student Achievement in High Poverty Schools, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1293,
1310-11 (2007) (discussing a national longitudinal study of almost ten thousand students
which indicates that attending a high-poverty school has a significant effect on the
achievement of students from poverty backgrounds).
31. Richard Rothstein & Tamara Wilder, The Education Achievement Gap: Who's
Affected and How Much, in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF
INADEQUATE EDUCATION (Clive Belfield & Henry Levin eds., forthcoming 2007)
(manuscript at 17-25, on file with the North Carolina Law Review). See generally, THE
BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998)
(defining and explaining causes of the gap). It should be pointed out, however, that since
the early 1970s (but less so in recent years), the scores of African-American students on
the NAEP exams have risen, but so have the scores of white students, thus leaving a
continuing gap. See INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 2006, at 143 (2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006071.pdf
(reading scores from 1971 to 2004); id. at 144 (math scores from 1973 to 2004); see also
Ross Wiener, Opportunity Gaps: The Injustice Underneath Achievement Gaps in Our
Public Schools, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1315, 1317 (2007) (finding "that less than half of students
from low-income families have demonstrated even basic skills in reading by the fourth
grade, whereas more than three of every four non-poor students have surpassed this
level," and that in eighth-grade mathematics, "half of all low-income students have below
basic skills, compared to just 21% of non-poor students").
32. JAY P. GREENE, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH & BLACK
ALLIANCE FOR EDUC. OPTIONS, HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES IN THE UNITED
STATES 3 (2002), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr baeo.pdf.
33. Cecilia E. Rouse, Income and Tax Revenues, in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION, supra note 31 (manuscript at 1, on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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individuals. Inadequate education dramatically raises crime rates and
health costs, denies the nation substantial tax revenues, and raises
serious questions about the civic competence of the next generation
to function productively in a complex democratic society.34 Over the
next twenty years, the students from minority groups who are
disproportionately represented among the dropout and low-achieving
student population will constitute a majority of the nation's public
school students. If they are not competent "knowledge workers,"
America's ability to compete effectively in the global marketplace
will be seriously jeopardized."
One of the ironies regarding educational opportunities for low-
income and minority children in America is that the United States
devotes proportionately more resources and attention to providing
educational opportunity than it does to any other area of social
welfare. In other words, "as other industrialized countries built and
enlarged comprehensive social welfare systems to create more
equality among their citizens" with subsidized income, health care,
pensions, and housing programs, the United States saw the "public
schools as the central means by which the government would help
improve the lives of the poor and disadvantaged."36 Resources and
34. See, e.g., Enrico Moretti, Crime and Costs of Criminal Justice, in THE PRICE WE
PAY: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION, supra note 31
(manuscript at 2, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (explaining the correlation
between education and crime, and the policy implications thereof); Peter Muennig, Health
Status and Social Costs, in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF
INADEQUATE EDUCATION, supra note 31 (manuscript at 2-3, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (calculating health losses of $57.9 billion associated with high
school non-graduates of 2004); Rouse, supra note 33 (manuscript at 1-3) (finding "if an
individual does not complete high school his income is lower which also means he is less
able to contribute to society... as reflected in tax revenues").
35. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 237-43, 265-75 (2005) (discussing the sharp challenge to
America's economic competitiveness posed by information technology and rising
education levels in India, China, and other third-world nations); Thomas Bailey,
Implications for Future Workforce, in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
COSTS OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION, supra note 31 (manuscript at 16-17, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (asserting that while the past effects of educational
inequality were limited to those individuals with minimal educations, "increasingly it will
be a problem for everyone" due to damaging effects on productivity and competition);
NAT'L CTR. ON EDUC. & THE'ECON., COMM. ON THE SKILLS OF THE AM. WORKFORCE,
TOUGH CHOICES OR TOUGH TIMES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8-9 (2007), available at
http://www.skillscommission.org/pdflexec -sumToughChoicesEXECSUM.pdf (proposing
innovative policies to reverse impending harmful consequences to America's position in
the world economy due to continuing educational inequality).
36. AMY STUART WELLS, OUR CHILDREN'S BURDEN: A HISTORY OF FEDERAL
EDUCATION POLICIES THAT ASK (NOW REQUIRE) OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS To SOLVE
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
opportunities provided in school, even when ample, cannot, however,
fully overcome the heavy impact of poverty on shaping children's
readiness to learn.37 To dramatically improve learning opportunities
for disadvantaged children and substantially improve their
educational outcomes, a proactive national policy agenda must focus
on ensuring the coordinated provision of opportunities in a broad
range of equity areas, including not only qualified teachers, up-to-
date textbooks, adequate facilities, and other aspects of K-12
education, but also in regard to areas like health, nutrition, housing,
and family support.
Over the past few decades, there have, in fact, been numerous
initiatives, programs, projects, and activities that fall under the
umbrella of what might be called "comprehensive educational equity"
(i.e., an approach to education that seeks to integrate a broad range
of out-of-school supports and services with school-based activities in
order to enhance students' abilities to succeed). The delivery models
employed include community, full-service, and extended schools;
comprehensive early childhood programs; school-linked services
projects; school-community partnerships; private interagency
commissions; family support and education programs; integrated-
services initiatives; and comprehensive community initiatives. The
need now is to understand how the best of these approaches can be
made to work in a cost-effective manner and to incorporate the
concept of comprehensive education into students' rights to equal
educational opportunity, if real progress toward overcoming poverty
and substantially reducing achievement gaps is to be achieved.
II. MONEY MATTERS
Despite the enormity of the deprivations suffered by children
from poverty backgrounds and the magnitude of their learning needs,
ironically, in the United States today the children with the greatest
needs generally have the fewest resources provided to them. The
Education Trust has estimated that nationwide, on average, spending
on children in high-poverty districts is $907 less per student than
spending on students in low-poverty districts.3" The situation is even
SOCIETAL INEQUALITY 2 (2006), available at http://www.tc.edu/centers/Equity
Symposiumlsymposium06/resource.asp.
37. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 20, at 37-47; Allgood, supra note 20, at 15-16.
38. EDUC. TRUST, THE FUNDING GAP 2005: LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY
STUDENTS SHORTCHANGED BY MOST STATES 2 (2005), http://www2.edtrust.org/
NR/rdonlyres/31D276EF-72E1-458A-8C71-E3D262A4C91E//FundingGap2005.pdf. Of
course, as the number of students enrolled in a school increases, the aggregate spending
1476 [Vol. 85
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worse in particular states.39 For example, my home state of New
York stands at the apex of national inequities, reporting a funding
gap of $2,280 between students in rich and low-income districts.4"
These averages mask the even more stark inequities that are
revealed by specific district-to-district comparisons. For example, in
New York, per capita spending on students in New York City, where
81% of the students come from poverty backgrounds,4" is $12,896,42
compared to $23,344 in Manhasset,43 where only 4.4% are from
poverty backgrounds.' Even greater disparities exist in other parts of
the State. For example, spending on students in rural Whitney Point,
where 46.2% of the students come from poverty backgrounds,45 is
$9,931," compared to $20,775 in Great Neck,47 where less than 10%
of the students are low-income.48
The root cause of these dramatic inequities is the fact that the
system for funding public schools in almost every state is based
gap for that particular school increases proportionately. See id. at 8 (highlighting in real
dollars the aggregate per school funding gap as student size increases). Thus, using the
national average gap of $907 per student, an elementary school of twenty-five students
would face a total gap of $22,675 a year, while a high school with 1,500 students would
experience an aggregate annual gap of $1,360,500. Id. at 2.
39. Id. at 3 tbl.1.
40. Id.
41. N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP'T, NEW YORK, THE STATE OF LEARNING: STATISTICAL
PROFILES OF PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS 26 tbl.1 (2005), http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/
irts/655report/2005/volume2Nol2 6559July2005_wBkmrks.pdf [hereinafter N.Y.
STATISTICAL PROFILES] (compiling extensive educational statistics for New York
schools). The "poverty background" statistics in the main text are based on the
proportion of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, which is the most widely
used poverty statistic for educational purposes. Cf. N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP'T, NEW
YORK, THE STATE OF LEARNING: STATEWIDE PROFILE OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
102 (2005), http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/irts/655report/2005/volumel/volumel.pdf
(discussing variables used to measure student poverty).
42. N.Y. STATISTICAL PROFILES, supra note 41, at 48 tbl.2 (showing the "Expended
per Pupil Unit" variable).
43. Id. at 47 tbl.2.
44. Id. at 26 tbl.1.
45. Id. at 18 tbl.1.
46. Id. at 40 tbl.2.
47. Id. at 47 tbl.2.
48. Id. at 25 tbl.2. For further discussion of the gross inequities in educational funding
throughout the United States, see, for example, JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 57, 73 (1991); Lawrence 0. Picus &
Minaz B. Fazal, Why Do We Know What Money Buys?, in WHERE DOES THE MONEY
Go? RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1, 5-7
(Lawrence 0. Picus & James L. Wattenbarger eds., 1996); BRUCE J. BIDDLE & DAVID C.
BERLINER, EDUC. POLICY STUDIES LAB., WHAT RESEARCH SAYS ABOUT UNEQUAL
FUNDING FOR SCHOOLS IN AMERICA 10 (2002), http://epsl.asu.edu/eprp/EPSL-0206-102-
EPRP.doc.
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largely on local funding and local property taxes. The American
system of local control and local funding of public schools originated
in an agricultural economy at a time when wealth was relatively
evenly distributed and land provided the tangible and predominant
basis for taxation.49 Given the current large differences in property
wealth between urban, rural, and suburban areas, however, the
traditional property tax system has become anachronistic. Other
developed countries either equalize funding across the board or have
systems that effectively compensate for any disparities in local
funding."
In the face of the overwhelming reality that the United States has
one of the most inequitable education finance systems in the world,
the retort of many politicians and pundits is that money really does
not matter in education. "Dollar bills don't educate students," said
President George H.W. Bush in 1991;51 "[jiust as more money has not
provided a remedy in the past, it will not miraculously do so in the
future,"52 noted the editors of the Wall Street Journal nearly a decade
later. Many policymakers believe, therefore, that the schools have
ample resources, and the reason that large numbers of students in the
inner cities, in many rural areas, and in pockets of underachievement
in the suburbs are not performing at satisfactory levels is that either
they or their teachers are not sufficiently motivated.
5 3
Those with the closest ties to the schools, however, uniformly
reject this way of thinking. Certainly, no parent, teacher, or school
administrator in any low-wealth school district in the United States-
49. ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 734
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 1934) (1919).
50. Robert E. Slavin, How Can Funding Equity Ensure Enhanced Achievement?, 24 J.
EDUC. FIN. 519, 519-20 (1999); see also Allan R. Odden, Toward the Twenty-First Century:
A School-Based Finance, in RETHINKING SCHOOL FINANCE: AN AGENDA FOR THE
1990s, at 322, 333-34 (Allan R. Odden ed., 1992) (describing Britain's national funding
system).
51. Susan Chira, Spending and Learning: Money's Role Questioned in Schools
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1991, at 1.
52. Editorial, More Money?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2000, at A22.
53. This perspective in fact permeates the No Child Left Behind Act:
[One explanation] for the ... massive underperformance by black and Latino
youths.... blames a dysfunctional school culture and a lax system of governance
and incentives that permits school systems to avoid making unpopular decisions,
even when those are essential to improving performance.... The law is premised
on the notion that local education politics are fundamentally broken, and that only
strong, external pressure on school systems, focused on student achievement, will
produce a political dynamic that leads to school improvement.
FREDERICK M. HESS & MICHAEL J. PETRILLI, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 22-23 (2006).
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or, for that matter, in any affluent community-genuinely believes
that money does not matter in education. If money did not matter,
wealthy parents would not send their children to private schools with
annual tuitions that often exceed $25,000, nor would parents move to
wealthy suburbs that spend in excess of $20,000 to educate their
students well.54 As a state court judge in North Carolina bluntly put it
after hearing extensive evidence on the subject, "Only a fool would
find that money does not matter in education.
5
A. The Academic Debate
The "money matters" debate has been carried out in academic
circles in recent years through technical discussions of "education
production function" analyses.56  Simply stated, an "education
54. See, e.g., Yilu Zhou, Despite Uncertain Times, Parents See Private School as a
Necessity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at B1 (noting that wealthy parents continue to enroll
their children in private schools with annual tuitions in excess of $20,000 notwithstanding
adverse market conditions); cf. Valerie Strauss, For Many Parents, Sending Children to
Private Schools Is Worth the Sacrifice, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1996, at B1 (describing
financial strain on middle class families who send their kids to expensive private schools
out of perceived necessity).
55. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *57
(N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000), aff'd, 358 N.C. 605, 599 S.E.2d 365 (2004).
56. The original impetus for the focus on the effect of additional resources on student
achievement was the famous "Coleman report" completed in 1966. JAMES S. COLEMAN
ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (1966). The study, led by James S. Coleman, a respected sociologist,
concluded that the largest determinants of student achievement are the "educational
backgrounds and aspirations of other students in the school." Id at 22. It went on to say
that "schools bring little influence to bear on a child's achievement that is independent of
his background and general social context." Id at 325.
In the years since the release of the Coleman report, a vast literature has
pinpointed significant methodological flaws in its analysis. Extensive empirical
investigations, more advanced regression analyses, and other techniques have substantially
refuted the report's overstated conclusions. According to Biddle and Berliner, the major
errors by Coleman and his colleagues included "fail[ure] to use available scaling
techniques to validate their procedures ... and fail[ure] to measure crucial variables now
known to be associated with school effects," as well as use of "non-standard procedures
for statistical analyses that generated falsely deflated estimates for school effects."
BIDDLE & BERLINER, supra note 48, at 15. James Guthrie sees as the major flaw of the
Coleman'report its failure-because of the limitations of data at the time-to disaggregate
school-based expenditures per pupil from district-level expenditures per pupil. James W.
Guthrie, Implications for Policy: What Might Happen in American Education if It Were
Known How Money Actually Is Spent?, in WHERE DOES THE MONEY GO?, supra note 48,
at 253, 260.
In any event, the proper conclusion to be drawn from Coleman's work is not that
we should invest less in students' education; on the contrary, Coleman himself concluded
that society needs to make much greater investments in creating the kind of "social
capital" that makes up for the deficiencies created by poverty backgrounds and that
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production function" analysis means using a regression analysis to
measure the effects of certain "inputs" (such as per pupil funding or
teacher salaries or textbooks) on an outcome (such as student
achievement, measured in terms of standardized test scores or
graduation rates).
Eric Hanushek, an economist at Stanford University's Hoover
Institution, has been the leading academic proponent of the use of
production function analyses to defend the proposition that money
does not matter. He has argued that "key resources-ones that are
the subject of much policy attention-are not consistently or
systematically related to improved student performance,"57 and that
increases in school funding to needy schools "could actually be
harmful" to students." Hanushek's position was initially based on
production function analyses he had undertaken on 187 regressions
based on thirty-eight primary studies of the relationship between
teacher/student ratios, teacher education, teacher experience, teacher
salary, facilities, and other such inputs, with outcomes mostly in terms
of standardized test scores, but that also include some instances of
"dropout rates, college continuation, student attitudes, or
performance after school."59
Production function analyses generally, and Hanushek's work in
particular, have been widely challenged as being simplistic and
misleading because they "do not adequately address serious questions
of causation,"' and because they do not "adequately account[] for
across-district variations" in the costs of educational services (such as
teacher salaries), and "in the proportion of students with special
needs, who require additional, more costly services."61 A related
"children and youth need to succeed in schools and as adults." JAMES S. COLEMAN,
EQUALITY AND ACHIEVEMENT IN EDUCATION 339 (1998); see infra Part IV.
57. Eric A. Hanushek, The Quest for Equalized Mediocrity: School Finance Reform
Without Consideration of School Performance, in WHERE DOES THE MONEY GO?, supra
note 48, at 20, 26-27.
58. Id. at 20.
59. Eric Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 434 (1991); see also Eric Hanushek, The Impact of Differential
Expenditures on School Performance, EDUC. RESEARCHER, May 1989, at 45, 45-65
(arguing for school funding policies that provide performance incentives).
60. Richard J. Murnane, Interpreting the Evidence on "Does Money Matter", 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 457, 458 (1991) (arguing that educational production functions are an
inappropriate measure for evaluating whether money matters because many such studies
fail to adequately address causation issues such as "school districts [with] relatively high
expenditure levels, including state and federal compensatory education funds, because
they serve students with low achievement levels").
61. Corrine Taylor, Does Money Matter? An Empirical Study Introducing Resource
Costs and Student Needs to Education Production Function Analysis, in U.S. DEP'T OF
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issue is that the production function analyses almost always measure
outcomes solely in terms of standardized test scores, which are not
complete and accurate measures of meaningful success.62
The most extensive rebuttal of Hanushek's methodology was
undertaken in a series of articles by University of Chicago education
researchers Rob Greenwald, Larry Hedges, and Richard Laine.63
They first closely analyzed the thirty-eight specific studies that
Hanushek had identified in his work, rejecting the "vote-counting"
approach he used to subjectively decide on the aspects of each study
that would be counted in the overall analysis;6' then, using broader
and more precise decision rules for conducting a comprehensive
meta-analysis of the relevant literature, they concluded that nine of
Hanushek's basic studies were inappropriate and that thirty-one other
studies should have been included.65 Analyzing in depth this larger
universe, they concluded that "a broad range of school inputs are
positively related to student outcomes, and that the magnitude of the
effects are sufficiently large to suggest that moderate increases in
spending may be associated with significant increases in
achievement."66  More recent studies concur in the view that
EDUC., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., PUBL'N NO. 98-212, DEVELOPMENTS IN SCHOOL
FINANCE 1997, at 75, 78 (William L. Fowler Jr. ed., 1998), available at http://nces.
ed.gov/pubs98/98212-5.pdf.
62. For example, economists David Card and Alan Krueger have argued that test
scores are only one measure of the impact of school quality. David Card & Alan B.
Krueger, Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education and the Characteristics of
Public Schools in the United States, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1-2 (1992). They offer
compelling evidence that, after controlling for socioeconomic status and geographic cost
variations, men educated in states with high-quality schools had, on average, more years of
schooling and higher earnings in the workforce. Id. at 3; see also David Card & Alan B.
Krueger, Labor Market Effects of School Quality: Theory and Evidence, in DOES MONEY
MATTER? THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND
ADULT SUCCESS 97, 97 (Gary Burtless ed., 1996) (highlighting differences in studies based
on test score outcomes and studies based on labor market outcomes).
63. Rob Greenwald et al., Does Money Matter?: A Meta-Analysis of Studies on the
Effects of Differential School Inputs on Student Outcomes, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Apr.
1994, at 5.
64. Id. at 6.
65. Richard Laine et al., Money Does Matter: A Research Synthesis of a New Universe
of Education Production Function Studies, in WHERE DOES THE MONEY GO?, supra note
48, at 44, 46-47 (explaining decision rules for excluding and including studies in analysis);
see also id. at 52 tbl.3.1 (reporting results of meta-analysis of education production
function studies using as input variables per pupil expenditure, teacher ability, teacher
education, teacher experience, teacher salary, teacher-pupil ratio, and school size).
66. Rob Greenwald et al., The Effect of School Resources on Student Achievement, 66
REV. EDUC. RES. 361, 362 (1996). Hanushek's reaction to the findings of Greenwald is set
forth in Eric A. Hanushek, A More Complete Picture of School Resource Policies, 66 REV.
EDUC. RES. 397, 397-98 (1996) (contending that inefficient use of resources presents a
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educational expenditures are correlated with positive student
outcomes, 67 a view that Hanushek himself no longer fully contests.'
The argument that money does not matter has also been fueled
by an erroneous view that real education spending has tripled in the
past few decades.69 Richard Rothstein and Karen Hawley Miles, in an
extensive analysis of this question, have shown that with inflation
adjustment, total real education spending per pupil increased by 61%
from 1967 to 1991, and that most of this increase went to funded
programs and services for students with disabilities, as mandated by
new federal laws granting educational rights to these students and
their families.7' The share of expenditures going to general education
during this period dropped from 80% to 59%, and the share going to
special education increased from 4% to 17%."1
B. The Courts' View
Not surprisingly, the national pattern of gross inequity and
inadequacy in school funding has spawned a wave of litigation in the
more important problem for schools than lack of funding); see also Alan B. Krueger,
Understanding the Magnitude and Effect of Class Size on Student Achievement, in THE
CLASS SIZE DEBATE 7, 8-9 (Lawrence Mishel & Richard Rothstein eds., 2002). In
deconstructing Hanushek's methodology, Krueger demonstrates that Hanushek places
substantially more weight on studies based on small samples; a correct analysis of
Hanushek's own data indicates that "class size is systemically related to student
performance." Id. at 9.
67. See, e.g., Allgood, supra note 20, at 73-103 (reviewing extensive studies correlating
pre-kindergarten programs, lower class sizes, teacher qualifications, teacher working
conditions, and other academic supports with improved student outcomes); Kristen
Harknett et al., Do Public Expenditures Improve Child Outcomes in the U.S.? A
Comparison Across Fifty States 17 (Ctr. for Policy Research, Maxwell Sch., Syracuse
Univ., Working Paper Series No. 53, 2003), available at http://www-cpr.maxwell.syr.
edu/cprwps/pdf/wp53.pdf (finding "particularly strong and positive effects" between
additional educational expenditures and student test scores and adolescent behavior).
68. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Hanushek, supra note 10, at xxx (stating that there has been a "tripling in
cost-adjusted per-student spending since 1960"); Frederick Hess, When Unaccountable
Courts Meet the Dysfunctional Schools, AM. ENTERPRISE, July-Aug. 2006, at 23, 25
("[A]fter-inflation school spending has more than tripled since 1960.").
70. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN & KAREN HAWLEY, ECON. POLICY INST., WHERE'S THE
MONEY GONE? CHANGES IN THE LEVEL AND COMPOSITION OF EDUCATION SPENDING
1 (1995), http://www.epi.org/books/moneygone.pdf.
71. Id. A follow-up study by Rothstein covering the period 1991-1996 indicated that
nationally, real school spending grew at a rate of only 0.7% for the whole five-year period.
During this time, the share of total spending going to special education, bilingual
education and school lunch and breakfast programs increased, while the total proportion
devoted to general education continued to decline. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON.
POLICY INST., WHERE'S THE MONEY GONE? CHANGES IN THE LEVEL AND
COMPOSITION OF EDUCATION SPENDING, 1991-96, at 1 (1997), http://www.epi.org/
books/moneygoing.pdf.
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state courts over the past three decades.72 Since 1973, litigation has
been filed in forty-five states, and plaintiffs have prevailed in the
majority of the forty-three states where courts have issued decisions.73
The cases clearly demonstrate how inequities in funding cause
resource deprivations that directly affect students' educational
opportunities. For example, many high schools in California's low-
income and minority communities do not offer the curriculum
students must take just to apply to the state's public universities.74
Passing an examination in a laboratory science course is required for
high school graduation in New York State, but thirty-one New York
City high schools have no science lab.75 In South Carolina, annual
teacher turnover rates exceed 20% in eight poor, rural, mostly
minority school districts,76 and in those districts graduation rates fall
between 33% and 57%.77
72. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), a case
involving inequities in education finance in Texas, the United States Supreme Court held
that education was not a "fundamental interest" under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, id. at 35, and that students in property-poor districts did not constitute a
"suspect class" for purposes of federal equal protection analysis, id. at 28. The closing of
the doors of the federal courts to challenges of inequities in education finance led
advocates to file litigations in the state courts, as discussed in the main text. For a detailed
discussion of Rodriguez, the subsequent state court litigations and their significance, see
Michael A. Rebell, Education Adequacy, Democracy and the Courts, in ACHIEVING HIGH
EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL 218, 219-28 (Timothy Read et al. eds., 2002); see
also PETER SCHRAG, FINAL TEST: THE BATrLE FOR ADEQUACY IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 76-77 (2003).
73. Plaintiffs have prevailed in twenty-six of the forty-three cases (60%). Of the more
recent subset of "adequacy" litigations decided since 1989, plaintiffs have prevailed in
twenty of twenty-seven final decisions of the highest state courts or unappealed trial court
decisions (74%). NATIONAL ACCESS NETWORK, "EQUITY" AND "ADEQUACY" SCHOOL
FUNDING COURT DECISIONS (Sept. 18, 2006), http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/
equityandadequacytable.pdf; NATIONAL ACCESS NETWORK, SCHOOL FUNDING
"ADEQUACY" DECISIONS SINCE 1989 (Oct. 2006), http://www.schoolfunding.info/
litigation/adequacydecisions.pdf.
74. See First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 63,
Williams v. State, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000), available at http://www.
decentschools.org/courtdocs/0lFirstAmendedComplaint.pdf; see also Robert Teranishi et
al., Opportunity at the Crossroads: Racial Inequality, School Segregation, and Higher
Education in California, 106 TCHRS. C. REC. 2224, 2238 (2004) (showing that schools with
greater proportions of blacks and Latinos were more likely to have fewer AP courses).
75. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE I1), 801 N.E.2d 326, 334 n.4 (N.Y. 2003).
76. See Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 93-CP-31-0169, slip op. at 93-94 (S.C. Ct.
Com. P1. Dec. 29, 2005), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/sc/Abbeville%
20Trial%20Court%200rder%2012-29-05.pdf.
77. See Molly A. Hunter, Plaintiff Witnesses Decry Conditions in South Carolina
Schools, Seeking Equal Opportunity 50 Years After Brown v. Education, Nat'l Access
Network, Tchr's. C., Columbia U. (Oct. 13, 2003), http://www.schoolfunding.info/
states/sc/10-14-03Abbeville.php3 (reporting abysmal graduation rates).
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In most of these litigations, the question of whether "money
matters" has been a central legal issue, and extensive expert
testimony on "production functions" and other technical economic
and social science issues was a critical aspect of the trial. For
example, in the recent Kansas litigation,78 more than half a dozen
experts on both sides of the issue presented detailed testimony on
whether money matters.7 9 After summarizing its findings regarding
the detailed testimony, the court concluded that
there is a causal connection between the poor performance of
the vulnerable and/or protected categories of Kansas students
and the low funding provided their schools.... Accordingly,
the Court finds as a matter of fact and law that the funding
scheme presently in place and as applied in Kansas by its
underfunding in general and by its mid and large-school
underfunding specifically, clearly and disparately injures
vulnerable and/or protected students and thus violates both
Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution and the equal protection
clauses of both the United States and Kansas Constitutions.80
Overall, the issue of whether money matters in education was
directly considered by the state courts in thirty of these cases.81 In
twenty-nine of them, the courts determined that money does indeed
78. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003),
affd, 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005).
79. See id.
80. Id. *49. In New York, the Court of Appeals in its preliminary decision remanding
the case for trial had stated that in order to prevail, the plaintiffs must "establish a
correlation between funding and educational opportunity ... [and] a causal link between
the present funding system and any proven failure to provide a sound basic education to
New York City school children." Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE 1), 655 N.E.2d
661, 667 (N.Y. 1995). When the case returned to the State's highest court years later, after
an extensive trial that included a similar "battle of the experts," the Court of Appeals
concluded that:
The trial court reasoned that the necessary "causal link" between the present
funding system and the poor performance of City schools could be established by a
showing that increased funding can provide better teachers, facilities and
instrumentalities of learning.... We agree that this showing, together with
evidence that such improved inputs yield better student performance, constituted
plaintiffs' prima facie case, which plaintiffs established.
CFE 11, 801 N.E.2d at 340; see also Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197
(Ky. 1989) ("[A]chievement test scores in the poorer districts are lower than those in the
richer districts and expert opinion clearly established that there is a correlation between
those scores and the wealth of the district.").
81. For a specific listing of these cases, see Michael A. Rebell, Does it Matter?, May 4,
2007 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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matter.82 In many of the cases, as in Kansas and New York, experts
explicitly testified on the specific issue of whether money matters. In
others, the courts implicitly considered this issue in their analyses of
whether the guarantee in the state constitution's education article of
an "equal" educational opportunity or of an "adequate" education
had been met if children in certain districts were deprived of critical
educational resources, such as certified teachers, up-to-date
textbooks, and decent facilities.8 3 In certain of these situations, the
court found that although many aspects of the state's education
finance system met constitutional requirements, additional funding
was needed to establish or expand particular programs or resources in
order to meet constitutional standards.' Some cases emphasize the
challenging nature of new state and national standards and hold that
additional resources are needed so that children can meet them.
8
Significantly, the courts that have found in favor of the
defendants in school finance litigations have not done so because they
have found that money does not matter, but for other reasons. When
defendants' positions have been upheld in these cases, it generally has
been because of either (1) separation of powers principles that hold
that these issues should be determined exclusively by the legislative
and executive branches, and not by the courts;86 or (2) the tradition of
82. Id. Eric Hanushek, the economist whose writings are discussed supra at notes 57
to 71, appeared as the prime witness for the defense on this issue in eleven of these cases.
Of the eleven cases in which he has testified, Hanushek has been on the losing side in nine
and on the winning side in two, but in those two cases where the state ultimately prevailed,
Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359
(N.Y. 1982) and Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, 458 A.2d 758 (Md.
1983), the highest state courts upheld the defendants' positions on other grounds and did
not reverse the lower courts' specific findings of fact that money does indeed matter.
83. See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993)
(holding that the New Hampshire Constitution requires the State "to provide a
constitutionally adequate education ... and to guarantee adequate funding"); Brigham v.
State, 692 A.2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997) ("[T]here is no reasonable doubt that substantial
funding differences significantly affect opportunities to learn.").
84. See, e.g., Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 93-CP-31-0169, slip op. at 149 (S.C.
Ct. Com. PI. Dec. 29, 2005), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/sc/
Abbeville%20Trial%20Court%20Order%2012-29-05.pdf (finding funding levels for
teachers, class size and facilities generally acceptable, but holding that funding must be
appropriated to programs for at-risk youth from early childhood through at least third
grade).
85. See Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, No. BVD-2002-528, 2004
WL 844055, at *13 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 2004).
86. See, e.g., Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,
408 (Fla. 1996) (ruling that plaintiffs did not meet the burden of showing that court
involvement in education finance issues would not violate separation of powers precepts);
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167-68 (Ga. 1981) (reversing lower court ruling in
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local control of education.87 In a number of these cases the district
court had specifically found that money does matter only to be
overruled by the state's high court based on justiciability or
procedural grounds.88 Some courts that have found in favor of the
defendants have also noted that the state constitution does require a
base level of adequate funding, but the plaintiffs in the case had not
alleged or proved that current funding was below that level.89
Only one court has clearly held that money does not matter. The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun °
used a combination of textual interpretation and legislative intent to
hold that the education finance system was constitutional. It also
relied on a vaguely referenced study that claimed that parental
involvement was the most influential aspect of a child's educational
opportunities and that increased spending did not necessarily have an
impact on the education a child received.91 The court did not,
however, discuss any specific reasons for rejecting the evidentiary
holding of the trial court that there was a clear causal link between
insufficient funding and poor student performance.92
favor of plaintiffs on the grounds that decisions regarding school finance are the realm of
the legislature and not of the court).
87. See., e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (I11. 1996)
(finding that the need to maintain local control of education overrode funding concerns);
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm'r, 659 A.2d 854, 858 (Me. 1995) (holding that the issue of
education funding should be left to localities and legislatures and not to the courts).
88. For example, the high court of Colorado in Lujan v. Colorado State Board of
Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982), wrote, "We refuse, however, to venture into the
realm of social policy," id. at 1018, even though the trial court had held that "[t]he level of
expenditures per pupil is directly related to the ability of a school district to provide a
measure of educational quality in its curricula and overall program." Id. at 1035.
89. See, e.g., Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 659 A.2d at 857 ("Plaintiffs presented no
evidence at trial that any disparities in funding resulted in their students receiving an
inadequate education."); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) ("[T]he
Students do not contend that the manner of funding prevents their schools from meeting
the standards of quality."); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Minn. 1993) ("[U]nlike
many cases in other states, this case never involved a challenge to the adequacy of
education in Minnesota.").
90. 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
91. Id. at 63 n.10.
92. In Abbeville County School District v. State, 93-CP-31-0169 (S.C. Ct. Com. P1. Dec.
29, 2005), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/sc/Abbeville%20Trial%20
Court%200rder%2012-29-05.pdf, the court stated, "It is clear that there is little, if any,
relationship between spending and achievement. The Plaintiff districts tend to be the
highest spending districts in the state, yet their achievement is lower .... " Id. at 145.
Despite this finding, however, the court mandated funding for early childhood education,
indicating that although this court believed that additional money for lowering class sizes
or improving facilities would not improve student achievement, money to provide
additional opportunities at the preschool level would be a worthwhile investment. Id. at
157.
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In the end, all of the elaborate economic production analyses and
discussions in the academic literature and in the legal decisions about
whether money matters really comes down to a basic consensus that,
of course, money matters-if it is spent well. Eric Hanushek,
historically the chief supporter of the "money doesn't matter" theory,
has himself recently acknowledged that "money spent wisely,
logically, and with accountability would be very useful indeed."93
There is no doubt that in order to obtain a meaningful educational
opportunity, low-income and minority children need qualified
teachers, adequate facilities, lower class sizes, more time on task, and
sufficient, up-to-date instrumentalities of learning. They also need
early childhood education, health services, good nutrition, family
support, and other programs and services that can successfully offset
the severe effects of poverty.94  The extent to which legal
interventions can ensure adequate funding-and appropriate
accountability measures to ensure that the funds are, in fact, used
well-will be the subjects of the balance of this Article.
III. IMPLEMENTING BROWN'S VISION OF EQUAL EDUCATION
A. Brown's Historical Significance
Egalitarianism, and especially equality of educational
opportunity, has historically been a significant imperative of
American democracy. The founding fathers expected schools to
assist in building the new nation by "the deliberate fashioning of a
new republican character."95 This new republican citizen was to be
93. Montoy v. State, 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *49 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2,
2003), affd, 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005). The court also noted that Hanushek concluded his
testimony by "agreeing with this statement: 'Only a fool would say money doesn't
matter.' " Id.; see also Hanushek, supra note 57, at 37-38 ("[T]he real problem is ... [that
n]othing in the current structure ... moves us to better use of resources.").
94. In other words, the findings of the Coleman report that socioeconomic factors
significantly affect children's ability to learn are correct, although the report's indication
that the effects of schooling are minimal was exaggerated. See supra note 56. Clearly, for
students from poverty backgrounds to become proficient in challenging state standards,
sufficient resources must be provided to offer them the opportunity for an adequate
education in school and to supplement their in-school experiences with programs and
activities that can reduce the detrimental impacts of poverty.
95. LAWRENCE CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE
1783-1873, at 3 (1980). For a detailed discussion of the founders' views on the importance
of education for the new democratic society, see Lorraine Smith Pangle & Thomas L.
Pangle, What the American Founders Have To Teach Us About Schooling for Democratic
Citizenship, in REDISCOVERING THE DEMOCRATIC PURPOSES OF EDUCATION 21
(Lorraine M. McDonnell et al. eds., 2000).
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molded through a radically new educational system, which, as John
Adams put it, "instead of being confined to a few schools and
universities for the instruction of the few, must become the national
care and expense for the formation of the many."96 The common
school movement of the nineteenth century was, in essence, a delayed
implementation of the egalitarian education ideals of the founding
fathers. As its name implies, the common school movement was an
attempt to educate in one setting all the children living in a particular
geographic area, whatever their class or ethnic background. 97
But the implementation of this ideal of equal educational
opportunity has been inconsistent and far from effective. At the
outset, egalitarian ideals, though extended to the "deserving" poor,
generally excluded women, recent immigrants,98 and other minorities,
especially black slaves and their emancipated descendants. Inherent
tensions between the country's competitive and egalitarian ideals99
have also moved the country in conflicting directions. Generally,
substantial movement toward equality has tended to occur
sporadically in the wake of war, major protest movements, or
economic cataclysm.1"
During the first half of the twentieth century, egalitarian reform
seemed to be at its nadir: "[i]nequalities of wealth, inequalities of
power and associated inequalities of opportunity seemed to dominate
all possible patterns for the future." '' The U.S. Supreme Court's
96. Letter from John Adams to Mathew Robinson (Mar. 23, 1786), quoted in DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 364 (2001).
97. The common schools, forerunners of the contemporary public school system,
replaced the prior patchwork pattern of town schools partially supported by parental
contributions, church schools, "pauper schools," and private schools, with a new form of
democratic schooling. For further discussions of the history of the common schools, see
CREMIN, supra note 95; see also CARL KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON
SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 1780-1860 (1983).
98. ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY (1997) presents a detailed historical account of how "U.S. leaders always
fostered senses of what made Americans a distinct 'people' that relied in part on
inegalitarian ascriptive themes." Id. at 471.
99. See JENNIFER N. HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE,
CLASS AND THE SOUL OF THE NATION 27-28 (1995) (describing the inherent competitive
tension of the "American dream," which promises that individual success will result from
hard work in a competitive, capitalist society that is inherently incapable of delivering such
rewards to all strivers).
100. See PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 3-4 (1999) (arguing that
movement toward greater equity occurs only in the wake of wars and pressures of
domestic political protest movements that bring pressure on national leaders to live up to
their "justificatory rhetoric").
101. J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 214 (1978).
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landmark decision outlawing school segregation in Brown v. Board of
Education" effected an abrupt turnaround in this state of affairs: it
reinvigorated America's historic egalitarian dynamic and initiated a
new era of ongoing egalitarian reform that has resulted in
thoroughgoing institutional change and a significant shift in political
attitudes. Thus, "[f]or the first time in American history, equality
became a major object of government policy ... government
agencies, and above all the courts, have been obliged to examine
constitutional principles in light of egalitarian pressures ... ."103 This
sustained egalitarian drive began with the elimination of state-
enforced racial segregation in 1954 and culminated almost fifty years
later in the bipartisan enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act
that mandates as national policy that all children must be proficient in
challenging state academic standards by 2014."°4
Brown's impact has been enormous. It proclaimed a broad
vision of "equal educational opportunity"'' 5 that has been accepted as
a precedent, an inspiration, and an imperative for change in a vast
range of legal and political contexts. As Senator Hillary Clinton
recently put it, "Without a doubt, the impact of Brown has been so
profound that it is hard to imagine how things could have been
otherwise. We witness the effects of Brown when we ride a train, eat
at a restaurant, or go to the beach."' 016 This vision fueled the civil
102. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
103. POLE, supra note 101, at 326.
104. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(F) (Supp. II 2002)
105, The phrase was mentioned no less than six times in the short decision. See Brown,
347 U.S. at 493.
106. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Brown at Fifty: Fulfilling the Promise, 23 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 213 (2005). But see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 46, 52-53 (1991) (disputing this view).
Rosenberg argues that the widely held assumption that Brown and other Supreme Court
decisions have had a major impact on the direction of social reform is overstated. He
discusses in detail the Southern resistance to Brown and the wavering response of the
federal courts to implementing desegregation in the decades following Brown. He does
not, however, give sufficient credence to the enormous impact of major court decisions on
value formation and on followup legislation. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT
WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 4 (1994)
(demonstrating the manner in which rights established through litigation fueled the
political movement for equal pay); DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 16 (2001) (analyzing the
impact of courts on education finance reform, partially as "a rejoinder to Rosenberg");
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 98-107 (1974) (discussing the relationship between legal rights and
progressive social movements). Similarly, Stephen Halpern argues that litigation focused
on Title VI distorted priorities and distracted efforts and attention from Brown's core
concern, that is, the need to overcome the impact of poverty and provide significant
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rights movement, and, as commentators have noted, Brown
"transformed the Court's role in the modern quest for equality ...
[and] unleashed a new era in constitutional jurisprudence."1 7
Although the explicit holding of the decision was focused on
terminating racial segregation in education, 108 the Court's ruling
quickly led to the articulation and implementation of new rights in
regard to ensuring equal opportunities in school discipline
practices,0 9 bilingual education,110 and a host of other educational
policy areas. The Brown precedent also was extended beyond the
school context to outlaw state-supported racial discrimination in
virtually every other area of American public life. " ' Brown has also
educational opportunities to black students. STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF
THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 3-4 (1995).
Halpern ignored, however, the role of the state court adequacy litigations in highlighting
this need and mandating remedies to meet it. See id. at 3. Halpern also ignores the fact
that without judicial intervention, the federal executive and legislative branches are not
likely to muster the "political will" to take significant action in this regard. See infra Part
IV.
107. David J. Garrow, The Supreme Court's Pursuit of Equality and Liberty and the
Burdens of History, in REDEFINING EQUALITY 205, 205 (Neal Devins & Davison M.
Douglas eds., 1998); see also Jack M. Balkin, A Critical Introduction to WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 3, 5 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (Brown
exemplifies "the Constitution reflect[ing] America's deepest ideals, which are gradually
realized through historical struggle and acts of great political courage").
108. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 ("We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.").
109. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). For a recent analysis of the
impact of Goss on the educational process, see generally RICHARD ARUM, JUDGING
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: THE CRISIS OF MORAL AUTHORITY (2003).
110. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974).
111. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958) (per curiam) (affirming lower court decision extending the decision to public
parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses); Mayor of Bait. v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971-2000h-6 (2000) (outlawing, inter alia, racial segregation in public
accommodations). The NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which developed and implemented
the legal strategy of multifaceted challenges to the separate but equal doctrine that
eventually led to the Brown decision, deliberately focused on education because they
expected a breakthrough in this sector to have large implications for other areas of social
policy. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 365, 370 (1975)
(describing in detail the development and implementation of the Legal Defense Fund's
long-range litigation strategy); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:
A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 12-45 (2001) (same); see also
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 290-92 (2004) (discussing the political and legal
factors that led to the Brown decision).
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been the foundation for a doctrinal extension of egalitarian precepts
to other historically disadvantaged groups, including women, the
aged, and the disabled'12  In addition, Brown spurred judicial
involvement in combating unconstitutional practices in a diverse
range of other social policy areas, including institutions for the
mentally ill" 3 and the developmentally disabled, 14 prison systems," 5
and local regulation of land use practices."1
6
112. The early constitutional law decisions concerning the rights of the disabled
explicitly relied on Brown. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874-75
(D.D.C. 1972); see also Dennis E. Haggerty & Edward S. Sacks, Education of the
Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 962
(1977) (claiming that "[c]hallenges by the handicapped to their exclusion from public
education" sprung from Brown). Similarly, many of the early antidiscrimination laws
created by Congress were expressly modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-05, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (2000)), which was the congressional codification of Brown's desegregation
mandate. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-07, 86 Stat. 235,
373-75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(2) (2000)) (prohibiting sex discrimination
in education programs receiving federal financial assistance); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000))
(prohibiting discrimination against the disabled in federally funded programs); Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-135, 89 Stat. 713 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6101-07 (2000)) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age in federally
funded programs); see also Cmty. Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 509 (1983)
(asserting that § 504 was patterned on Title VI); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,
684-85 (1979) (upholding a private right of action for sex discrimination); ROSEMARY C.
SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL POLICY
IN THE POST-BROWN ERA 124-36 (1986) (exploring the history of Title IX); Peter H.
Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 YALE
L.J. 27, 29 (1979) ("The ADA is the offspring of-indeed, is expressly modeled upon-
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... "). For a discussion of the legislative history of
Title VI, see MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EQUALITY AND EDUCATION:
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN THE NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM 38-
48 (1985).
113. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 374 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part
sub nom. Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
114. N.Y. State Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 765
(E.D.N.Y. 1973). For a case study analysis of this case, see generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN
& SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS: A DECADE OF STRUGGLE FOR
SOCIAL JUSTICE (1984).
115. The extensive involvement of the federal courts in reforming unconstitutional
practices in state prison systems is discussed in detail in MALCOLM M. FEELEY &
EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE
COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998)
116. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 299 (1976) (holding that a federal
district court had power to order HUD to "attempt to create housing alternatives for the
respondents"). For a case study discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's extensive
involvement in Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(1975), see DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF
SUBURBIA (1995).
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The extensive judicial involvement in implementing egalitarian
ideals spurred by Brown not only placed equal opportunity issues at
the top of the nation's political agenda, but it also dramatically
altered the way in which these issues henceforth would be handled.
Once desegregation and educational opportunity issues were
incorporated into the heart of the courts' agenda, remedies to
overcome inequity became imperative policy mandates, and a
dynamic of ongoing egalitarian reform became embedded throughout
the political culture. The strength of this dynamic has, however,
advanced and ebbed over the past half century, as will be
demonstrated in the next subsection.
B. Past Patterns of Implementation
In choosing education as the subject area for reversing the
"separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,'17 the Supreme
Court necessarily focused on the role of education in modern society.
In doing so, it issued an oft-quoted, ringing statement about the
central importance of education in contemporary American life:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It
is the very foundation of good citizenship .... In these days, it
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.118
117. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Court had considered equality issues in the
context of public transportation.
118. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The central importance of
education in contemporary American life has since been reiterated by the Court on
numerous occasions. See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (emphasizing "the
pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural heritage"); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (describing schools as places where the "fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system" are conveyed); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (" '[T]he grave significance
of education both to the individual and to our society' cannot be doubted." (quoting
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280,283 (W.D. Tex. 1971))); Sch.
Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(asserting that public schools are "a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a
democratic system of government").
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Through a series of prior cases involving graduate school
education, the Court had established the importance of educational
resources and facilities to providing an equal educational opportunity
and the fact that the resources and facilities provided to people of
color, were, in fact, almost never equal.119 Moreover, the Court had
previously held that even if the physical factors could be equalized,
intangible factors that affected a law student's "ability to study, to
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession," could not be adequately conveyed in
a segregated setting. 2° This led directly to the Court's core holding in
Brown that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal
because
[t]o separate [children in grade and high schools] from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.
Thus, the profundity of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
lay not merely in outlawing racial segregation in schools, but also in
the manner in which, through careful analysis of extensive evidence
accumulated in the immediate case and in prior precedents, and by
taking note of broader social science findings, it came to understand
119. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950) (holding that a separate in-state
black law school did not provide adequate faculty, variety of courses, and opportunity for
specialization); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948)
(holding that the State must provide legal education to African-American students at a
white law school since it had no minority counterpart); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337, 349-50 (1938) (payment of tuition at an out-of-state law school did not
provide equal opportunity). For a discussion of the deliberate strategy of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund to bring cases involving graduate school and law school experiences,
which the Justices themselves could readily appreciate, see KLUGER, supra note 111, at
136-37.
120. McLaurin v. Okla. State Bd. of Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950) (separate
"ghetto" bench in graduate school facility impeded black plaintiff's ability to learn).
121. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. This finding was bolstered by the Court's famous
footnote 11, which cited a number of social science studies for the proposition that,
"[w]hatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority." Id. Footnote 11 led to a
vast range of commentary on whether the social science references in that case were an
essential part of the holding or obiter dicta which merely illustrated the basic legal
conclusion that racial segregation in education was inherently unequal. For an overview
of discussions of the issue of the Court's use of social science evidence, see generally PAUL
ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972). See also Betsy Levin &
Philip Moise, School Desegregation Litigation in the Seventies and the Use of Social Science
Evidence: An Annotated Guide, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1975, at 50.
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precisely how the challenged practice impeded meaningful
educational opportunity for the plaintiffs. Even if the physical
facilities and resources could be made equivalent, the Court
understood that the opportunity that would be provided in a school
that was set aside from the majority culture as a matter of law could
never be truly equal. To provide a meaningful opportunity, schools
must remove the inherent stigma imposed by racial segregation.
Although the Court allowed about a decade to go by before it
began to vigorously enforce Brown's desegregation mandate, 22 when
it finally did actively confront the political resistance to
desegregation, it did so by insisting on meaningful and not merely pro
forma compliance. It rejected stratagems like publicly funded
segregated academies, 123 and the use of a "freedom of choice plan,'
' 24
and it emphasized the need for a desegregation plan "that promises
realistically to work and promises realistically to work now., 125 In this
regard, the Court, among other things, promulgated a series of
specific standards that endorsed the use of busing, upheld reliance on
numerical guidelines for racial balance in local schools, and advocated
the redrawing of attendance zones to promote desegregation.
126
At the same time that the Supreme Court began to actively
implement the Brown mandate, Congress substantially aided the
courts' efforts to provide meaningful educational opportunities for
blacks and other disadvantaged children by enacting the first major
federal aid to education act. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA") 127 provided substantial federal
funding to school districts to assist them in meeting the educational
needs of economically disadvantaged students.2 8  EffectiVe
enforcement of Brown's desegregation mandate was also
substantially aided by the passage of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, which empowered the Federal Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to cut off federal funding to any school
district that discriminated on the basis of race, color, or national
122. In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), the Court
addressed the remedy issue of how to implement the Brown decision. The Court decided
to entrust the details of implementing desegregation to the federal district courts, and it
advised them to act with "all deliberate speed." The initial response of most of the lower
federal courts was "deliberate," but hardly "speedy."
123. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
124. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
125. Id. at 439.
126. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Rd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 3 (1971).
127. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000).
128. Id.
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origin.'2 9  Taken together, the ESEA and Title VI provided both a
carrot and a stick for effective enforcement: now that substantial
amounts of federal funds were available, these funds could also be
withheld if schools districts were found to be in violation of the
desegregation orders of the federal courts. 130
In addition to providing substantial funding to all economically
disadvantaged students through Title I and codifying the
antidiscrimination rights of racial and national origin minorities in
Title VI, Congress also provided an extensive set of substantive and
procedural rights for children with disabilities through the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.131 This legislation not
only set aside state statutes that had in the past excluded many
children with disabilities from attending school, but it also required
that school districts provide these students a truly meaningful
educational opportunity. It did this by entitling all children with
disabilities to a "free appropriate public education" that guarantees
each child specially designed instruction, and "related services," to
meet his or her unique educational needs, at no cost to parents or
guardians.132 The law also provides parents an extensive array of
129. Title VI, in essence, codified and enforced through a funding termination
mechanism the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It provides that
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(2000). For a detailed discussion of the congressional deliberations around the enactment
of Title VI, see REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 112, at 38-56.
130. The combination of forceful decisions by the Supreme Court and passage of Title
VI and the ESEA in the 1960s had dramatic results: although more than 98% of black
students in the states of the deep South had been attending schools that had 90% or more
black students in 1964, by 1972 less than 9% were in such segregated facilities. Jeremy
Rabkin, Office for Civil Rights, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 304, 338 (James Q.
Wilson ed., 1980).
131. H.R. REP. No. 94-332, 1-2 (1975). The current version of this statute is now
known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C § 1400
(Supp. IV 2004).
132. "Special education" is defined under the Act as including classroom instruction,
instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and
institutions. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29). "Related services" are defined as "transportation, and
such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services ... including speech-
language pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services,
physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation." Id.
§ 1401(26A). The "free appropriate public education" required by the Act is tailored to
meet the unique needs of the student with disabilities by means of a mandated
"individualized educational program" ("IEP"), and by the requirement that to the
maximum extent feasible, children with disabilities must be educated with the non-
disabled. Id. § 1401(9) (emphasis added).
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procedural opportunities and due process rights to oversee the
appropriateness of the services being provided to their children.'33
In enforcing these congressional statutes, the Court further
developed the concept of meaningful educational opportunity. Lau v.
Nichols,' a case involving the educational opportunities of a class of
students of Chinese ancestry who did not speak English, was a prime
case in point. In Lau, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit had rejected the plaintiffs' claim for additional
educational services that would allow them to overcome their
language limitations. The Supreme Court decisively rejected this
stance. Applying the antidiscrimination precepts of Title VI, the
Court held that "there is no equality of treatment merely by
providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and
curriculum; for students who do not understand English are
effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education."'35
Two decades after Brown, then, thoroughgoing egalitarian
initiatives had taken root, and principle was turning into practice.
Meaningful educational opportunities began to be provided to black
children in integrated school settings, to students with disabilities in
educational settings that were being shaped to accommodate their
needs, 36 and to English language learners in bilingual classrooms.
Shortly thereafter, however, as the venue of the desegregation
confrontations moved to northern and western locales, the Supreme
Court's firm efforts to enforce meaningful educational opportunities
began to weaken. 137 In cases involving the Denver and Detroit school
133. See, e.g., id. § 1415 (entitling parents to request an impartial hearing and
subsequent judicial appeals to contest any aspect of their child's diagnosis or educational
opportunities).
134. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
135. Id. at 566 (emphasis added). Having reversed the lower court's ruling on statutory
grounds, the Court did not reach the constitutional issues.
136. See, e.g., Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Special Educational Inclusion
and the Courts: A Proposal for a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 523, 524-25
(1996) (describing a substantial shift from separate educational settings to "inclusive"
settings for students with disabilities in response to the IDEA).
137. This also coincided with President Richard Nixon replacing four of the Supreme
Court Justices with more conservative jurists. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF
RIGHTS: FDR'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER
153-54 (2004). This is not to say that Supreme Court jurisprudence directly changes with
the election results. Constitutional jurisprudence is constrained by principle and
precedent, whatever the philosophies of the particular Justices, but a major change in
personnel, as occurred at this time, can move the direction of future development of
precedent and principle in a different direction over time, or accelerate the pace of
change. Sunstein's point, that election of a different President who appointed different
Justices might have allowed a full flowering of social and economic welfare programs,
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systems, the Court issued two critical rulings that substantially slowed
progress toward desegregation. First, it declared that nonintentional,
de facto desegregation resulting from segregated housing patterns
was not unconstitutional.'38 And, second, it held that extensive urban
segregation patterns could not be remedied by a mandatory
metropolitan area desegregation scheme in the absence of evidence
that the suburban districts had, in the past, intentionally discriminated
against minority students. 13 9 In essence, in these cases, local control
of education and countervailing "liberty" interests trumped the strong
emphasis the Court had previously placed on ensuring effective
desegregated schooling environments for black children.
The Supreme Court also declined to take a further necessary step
toward providing meaningful educational opportunities for poor and
minority children when it refused in Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Independent School District4 ' to invalidate the gross disparities in
Texas's education finance system, which the Court acknowledged
were highly inequitable. 4' Although the logic of Brown would seem
to have implied that in order to provide meaningful educational
opportunities for black children who had attended inherently
though probably true, overlooks the fact that in the education sector, the egalitarian seeds
already planted by Brown and its progeny did continue to blossom in state courts and in
state and federal standards-based reform initiatives, as will be discussed in the next
subsection of this Article.
138. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1973). Justices Douglas and
Powell advocated abandoning the de jure/de facto distinction in their concurring opinion,
Id. at 214-15, 217-19. The logic of Brown's holding that separate schools were inherently
unequal would seem to have called for remedying all segregated schooling patterns,
whether these had originated because of "purposeful" state laws and actions (de jure
segregation), or because of "natural" housing trends and other such developments (de
facto segregation). See, e.g., Paul R. Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There Is
but One Constitution, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972) (proposing a national
standard of equal protection). A number of lower federal courts had previously held that
de facto segregation was unconstitutional under the Brown precedent. See, e.g., Oliver v.
Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 766, 775-76, 779 (W.D. Mich. 1972), affd, 448 F.2d
635 (6th Cir. 1972) (finding segregation due to the placing of boundary lines to be
unconstitutional); Johnson v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315, 1318-19 (N.D. Cal.
1971) (discussing true de facto segregation); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311
F. Supp. 501, 504 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (holding a neighborhood school policy to be
unconstitutional).
139. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 717-18 (1974). For a thoughtful analysis of the
barriers imposed by the Milliken decision to effective implementation of desegregation
remedies, see generally Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983).
140. 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see supra note 72.
141. Id. at 16-17, 58. Plaintiffs who attended school in the property-poor Edgewood
school district had about half as much spent on their education on a per capita basis
compared to white students in the affluent neighboring Alamo Heights, even though the
tax rate in the poor district was 24% higher than in the affluent district. Id. at 12-13.
20071 1497
1498 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85
inadequate segregated schools, the schools they now attend must at
least have adequate resources, the Supreme Court refused to
invalidate Texas's highly inequitable state education finance system.
Instead, it held that education was not "a fundamental interest"
under the Federal Constitution, and that it was outside the domain of
federal constitutional law to further scrutinize the significance of the
educational opportunities being afforded to residents of property-
poor school districts.
142
In the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court began to focus on the
question of when remedial decrees in longstanding desegregation
cases should be terminated.1 43 In a series of such decisions, the Court
determined that the test for judging when a school board was entitled
to be free of continuing judicial supervision would be whether the
board has "complied in good faith with the desegregation decree
since it was entered, and whether ... vestiges of past de jure
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable."
144
Although for a time, the Court hinted that relative per pupil
expenditures and "objective evidence of black achievement" might be
appropriate factors to consider in determining whether the vestiges of
past segregation had been eliminated,145 the Supreme Court's
142. In declaring that education was not a fundamental interest under the Federal
Constitution, the Supreme Court had to confront its own strong statement in Brown that
"it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). After
restating the full passage in which this phrase appears in Brown, the Court in Rodriguez,
somewhat abashedly, stated, "Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts from our
historic dedication to public education." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30. Ironically, the year
after it issued its ruling in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court upheld the use of extra
compensatory funding as a follow-up remedy for the Detroit students who were precluded
by the Court's decision in Milliken from attending integrated schools in the suburbs.
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 267-68 (1977); see also HALPERN, supra
note 106, at 312-16 (arguing that thoroughgoing educational opportunity, not ratios of
black to white students, was the true intent of Brown).
143. At this time, the Court also narrowly interpreted the rights of students with
disabilities under the IDEA, holding that the law entitled a student only to some quantum
of "educational benefits," but not to "an opportunity to achieve his full potential,
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children," the standard which had
been adopted by the lower courts. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 (1982). For a
detailed analysis of the equal opportunity aspects of this decision, see Michael A. Rebell,
Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEO. L.J. 1435 (1986).
144. Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991).
145. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 483, 496 (1992) (stating that courts could
relinquish supervision of school districts in incremental stages and upholding district court
order, requiring the school district to equalize per pupil expenditures in majority white
and majority black schools because of differences in teaching quality in these schools).
Some commentators viewed this emphasis on the actual achievement of minority students
as a potential method for reinvigorating desegregation lawsuits and making them into
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subsequent decision in Missouri v. Jenkins"4 dampened any such
expectations. The Court there reversed a lower court ruling that
would have required the State of Missouri to continue to fund quality
educational programs because student achievement levels were below
national norms at many grade levels.
147
By emphasizing what is "practicable" for local school districts,
rather than how to provide "meaningful" opportunities for black
students, the federal courts after Jenkins were essentially abandoning
any serious efforts to implement Brown's vision of equal educational
opportunity. As one commentator put it:
Developments in federal school desegregation jurisprudence in
the early 1990s ... suggest that the litigation era reaching back
to Brown v. Board of Education is now drawing to a close ...
curtailing continuing federal court jurisdiction over a district
that had once acted illegally opens the way for the district also
to abandon some of the special efforts that had been imposed
on it-both programs aimed explicitly at achieving racially
balanced student bodies and those aimed more at improving
the educational opportunities offered in the often heavily
minority schools.14
Not surprisingly, over the past decade, there has been a marked trend
toward resegregation in the nation's public schools.'49
vehicles for assuring quality education. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, The Legal Rhetorical
Structure for the Conversion of Desegregation Lawsuits to Quality Education Lawsuits, 42
EMORY L.J. 791, 803 (1993) (discussing the effects of Freeman).
146. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
147. Id. at 71-72.
148. Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Adequacy and the Courts:
The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN
EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 175, 187 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds.,
1999); see also Chris Hansen, Are the Courts Giving Up? Current Issues in School
Desegregation, 42 EMORY L.J. 863, 864 (1993) (describing changes in the courts' attitudes
toward desegregation litigation); Theodore M. Shaw, Missouri v. Jenkins:" Are We Really a
Desegregated Society?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 60 (1992) (arguing that once a school
district is relieved from court supervision, vestiges of segregation in areas like housing
again become operative).
149. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; see also Gary Orfield, Conservative
Activists and the Rush Toward Resegregation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX
STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATION EQUITY 39, 56 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999)
(arguing that these desegregation cases signal a "rush to resegregate" by conservative
federal judges who have terminated desegregation plans without holding full evidentiary
hearings, and without fairly assessing the educational ramifications of these terminations).
The impact of Title VI has also been substantially diminished by the Supreme Court's
decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which eliminated the private right
of action for discriminatory impact cases, which had been a major litigation tool of civil
rights advocates. Id. at 293
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At the dawn of the new century, almost fifty years after Brown
had been decided, the contours of what was required to provide
blacks and other historically disadvantaged groups equal educational
opportunities had been sketched by the federal courts, but they were
no longer actively engaged in completing the picture. The continuing
power of the Brown vision was demonstrated, however, by the fact
that as egalitarian initiatives waned in the federal courts, they took on
renewed vigor in the state courts and in the Congress.
C. The State Court Decisions on Education Adequacy
At about the same time that the Supreme Court's active
involvement with desegregation remedies was beginning to lag,
successful legal challenges to the inequities in state education finance
systems began to accelerate in the state courts.15° Although the
education finance and education adequacy cases could not ensure
integrated school settings, they did respond to the reality that most
poor and minority students attended school in property-poor urban
or rural school districts that were substantially underfunded in
comparison to schools in affluent, largely white suburban school
districts.'
The results of these efforts have been extraordinary: challenges
to inequities in state funding systems have been filed in more than
forty states over the past thirty-five years, and plaintiffs have won
major decisions in more than 60% of them.'52 Moreover, as the
150. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
151. Some have argued that to some degree, the state education finance cases can be
said to be reasserting the "separate but equal" doctrine the Supreme Court overruled in
Brown. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 30, at 258-60. Equity in funding can also be viewed,
however, as an important prerequisite (although not a substitute) for effective integrated
education. See, e.g., REED, supra note 106, at 4-5 (arguing that state education finance
cases arose from "a growing sense among civil rights lawyers that desegregation alone
would not get to the heart of unequal educational opportunity"); see also Drew S. Days
III, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, in REDEFINING EQUALITY, supra note
107, at 139, 141 (describing specific ways that growing numbers of blacks are turning away
from the integrative ideal because of ineffective implementation of Brown).
152. For detailed information about these cases and ongoing updates regarding cases
involving challenges to state education finance systems, see the website of the ACCESS
Network, Teachers College, Columbia University, http://www.schoolfunding.info (last
visited Apr. 15, 2007). The education finance and education adequacy litigations, in fact,
constitute the most creative flowering of state court constitutionalism in the nation's
history. The large-scale resort to the state courts, of course, was triggered by the U.S.
Supreme Court's closing of the gates to the federal courts in Rodriguez. Although the
Supreme Court held that education was not a "fundamental interest" under the federal
constitution, education clearly is a "fundamental interest" under many state constitutions.
For a detailed discussion of Rodriguez and the state court litigations, see generally Rebell,
supra note 72; SCHRAG, supra note 72.
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courts' emphasis in these cases has shifted in recent years from
rectifying abstract fiscal inequities to ensuring that "adequate"
educational opportunities are actually available for all students,
plaintiffs have prevailed in three-quarters of the major decisions.'53
The recent wave of state court cases challenging state education
finance systems have been called "adequacy" cases because they are
based on clauses in almost all state constitutions, which, although
utilizing differing terms, like "thorough and efficient" education,
"ample" education, or "sound basic education" guarantee all students
some minimal level of "adequate education."' 54 These provisions
generally were incorporated into the state constitutions as part of the
common school movement of the mid-nineteenth century.
155
Compulsory schooling, which became prevalent in most states by the
153. See ACCESS Network, Teachers College, Columbia University, http://www.
schoolfunding.info/litigation/adequacydecisions.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).
154. For an overview of the education clauses in the state constitutions, discussed in
terms of four basic categories related to the relative "strength" of the educational clauses,
see generally William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in
School Finance Litigation, 79 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 19 (Feb. 1993). Thro's categorization
of the education clauses in the state constitutions in terms of the strength of their language
and his predictions regarding the likely outcome of court cases based on his
categorizations have been belied by the actual decisions. For example, based on Thro's
categorization, plaintiffs should have won the cases in states like Maine, Rhode Island, and
Illinois (which have "strong" constitutional language) and which they in fact lost, see Sch.
Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm'r, 659 A.2d 854, 858 (Me. 1995); City of Pawtucket v.
Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 49, 57 (R.I. 1995); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d
1178, 1187, 1189 (II. 1996); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ill. 1999), and lost
the decisions in states having weak constitutional language like New York, North
Carolina, and Vermont, which they in fact won, see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State
(CFE I), 801 N.E.2d 326, 329 (N.Y. 2003); Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 347, 488 S.E.2d
249, 255 (1997); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997).
155. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. Some state courts have in practice
adopted contemporary terms to describe the requirements for adequate education in the
state constitution in place of anachronistic nineteenth century terminology. For example,
"[slound basic education" is a term utilized by the highest courts in New York and North
Carolina to provide contemporary meaning to constitutional clauses adopted in the
nineteenth century that require the legislature to establish a "system of free common
schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated," N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1
(amended 1938), and a "general and uniform system of free public schools," N.C. CONST.
art. IX, § 2 cl. 1. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345, 488 S.E.2d at 254 (interpreting education
clause in North Carolina's state constitution); Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 368
(N.Y. 1982) (interpreting education clause in New York's state constitution).
Several of the state constitutions' education clauses were enacted in the
eighteenth century and contained phrases concerning the duty of the legislature to
"cherish ... public schools," see, e.g., MASS. CONST. part 2, ch. 5, § II, which courts have
interpreted to mandate "an adequate education." McDuffy v. Sec'y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d
516, 548 (Mass. 1993); accord Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381
(N.H. 1993); see also Brigham, 692 A.2d at 392 (drafters of the Vermont Constitution
sought to foster "republican values or public 'virtue' ").
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beginning of the twentieth century, added an additional rationale for
the emphasis on education in the state constitutions.
156
Although the state defendants in many of these cases have
argued that the adequacy clauses in the state constitutions should be
interpreted to guarantee students only a "minimal" level of
education, by and large, the state courts that have closely reviewed
students' needs in contemporary society have called instead for an
education system that is at substantially more than a minimum
level.157 This high minimum approach focuses on what would be
needed to assure that all children have access to those educational
opportunities that are necessary to gain a level of learning and skills
that are now required to obtain a good job in our increasingly
technologically complex society158 and to participate effectively in our
ever more complicated political process. 159
156. In Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court analyzed in detail
the purposes of compulsory education before allowing the Amish plaintiffs a limited
exemption from it. In doing so, the Court accepted the state's twofold justification for
compulsory education, that is, preparation of citizens "to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system," and preparation of individuals "to be self-
reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." Id. at 221; cf. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d
1241, 1259 (Cal. 1971) ("Education is so important that the state has made it
compulsory.").
157. See, e.g., William H. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School Finance,
8 EDUC. POL'Y 376, 376 (1994) (describing the thrust of the cases as calling for a high
minimum level).
158. Minorini and Sugarman, supra note 148, at 188. The policy statement of the 1996
National Education Summit, endorsed by President Clinton, forty-one governors, and
forty-eight CEOs of major American corporations, specifically described the type of
cognitive skills students need for the contemporary job market: "In addition to basic
skills, all individuals must be able to think their way through the workday, analyzing
problems, proposing solutions, communicating, working collaboratively and managing
resources such as time and materials." 1996 NATIONAL EDUCATION SUMMIT POLICY
STATEMENT; see also ACHIEVE, INC., BENCHMARKING THE BEST 3 (1999) ("Almost two-
thirds of today's workforce needs advanced reading, writing, mathematical and critical
thinking skills, compared to only 15% of workers just twenty years ago."); DEBORAH
WHETZEL, AM. INST. FOR RESEARCH, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR'S COMMISSION ON
ACHIEVING NECESSARY SKILLS 3-4 (1991) (finding that students need much higher levels
of technical skill and knowledge than in the past, including the ability to manage and
comprehend complex texts and information); NAT'L CTR. ON EDUC. & THE ECON.,
AMERICA'S CHOICE: HIGH SKILLS OR Low WAGES! 64-65 (1990) (comparing skill levels
of students graduating from American schools with graduates of other industrial nations
and concluding that American workers need higher level skills to be competitive); COMM.
ON THE SKILLS OF THE AM. WORKFORCE, supra note 35, at xix ("This is a world in which
a very high level of preparation in reading, writing, speaking, mathematics, science,
literature, history, and the arts will be an indispensable foundation for everything that
comes after for most members of the workforce.").
159. The kind of skills that students need to be "capable" voters and jurors have been
described as "the intellectual tools to evaluate complex issues, such as campaign finance
reform, tax policy, and global warning, to name only a few.... Jurors today must
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Accordingly, many of the cases have specified that an adequate
education must include, in addition to traditional reading and
mathematical skills, knowledge of the physical sciences and "a
fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems,
and of history and governmental processes; and academic and
vocational skills.' 160 Some cases have held that it also includes "the
ability to appreciate music, art, and literature, and the ability to share
all of that with friends.' 61
One of the clearest rejections of a minimalist interpretation of a
state constitution adequacy clause was the 2003 decision of the New
York Court of Appeals, the State's highest court. In invalidating the
Appellate Division's holding that the constitution required an
education that would provide students only eighth-grade level skills,
the court held that New York's schoolchildren are constitutionally
entitled to the "opportunity for a meaningful high school education,
one which prepares them to function productively as civic
participants."'62 In doing so, the court stressed that although in the
nineteenth century, when the State's adequacy clause was adopted, a
sound basic education may well have consisted of an eighth- or ninth-
grade education, "[t]he definition of a sound basic education must
serve the future as well as the case now before us.
1' 63
In focusing on the actual educational needs of students in the
twenty-first century, some of the state courts have begun to take note
of the fact that some students who come to school disadvantaged by
the burdens of severe poverty need a more comprehensive set of
services and resources in order to have a meaningful educational
opportunity. Thus, in ordering that additional resources beyond the
level currently enjoyed by students in affluent suburbs be provided to
students in the state's poorest urban districts, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that:
determine questions of fact concerning DNA evidence, statistical analyses, and convoluted
financial fraud, to name only three topics." Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719
N.Y.S.2d 475, 485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001), affd, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003).
160. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999); see also Rose
v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989) (discussing the stark
differences in achievement between districts); McDuffy v. Sec'y of Office of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (noting areas that need significant improvement); Claremont
Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) (noting the State's duty to fund
public education), Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255 (defining a "sound basic
education").
161. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 397 (N.J. 1990).
162. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 801 N.E.2d at 332 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 349.
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This record shows that the educational needs of students in
poorer urban districts vastly exceed those of others, especially
those from richer districts. The difference is monumental, no
matter how it is measured. Those needs go beyond educational
needs, they include food, clothing and shelter, and extend to
lack of close family and community ties and support, and lack
of helpful role models. They include the needs that arise from a
life led in an environment of violence, poverty, and despair ....
The goal is to motivate them, to wipe out their disadvantages as
much as a school district can, and to give them an educational
opportunity that will enable them to use their innate ability. 164
At least two state courts have also held that students from
poverty backgrounds must be given access to early childhood services
in order to receive the opportunity for a meaningful education. In
October 2000, trial court Judge Howard Manning ruled in North
Carolina's school funding case that many disadvantaged children
were unprepared for school due to the absence of prekindergarten
opportunities, and, accordingly, he ordered the State to provide
prekindergarten programs for all "at-risk" four-year-olds.165 When
the case reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 2004, the
court agreed with Judge Manning's holdings that the State was
ultimately responsible "to meet the needs of 'at-risk' students in order
for such students to avail themselves of their right to the opportunity
to obtain a sound basic education"'166 and that the State must provide
services to such children "prior to their entering the public
schools."'67
164. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 400. This holding is, in effect, a direct refutation of the
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Lau, which had stated in the decision that was reversed
by the U.S. Supreme Court, see supra note 135 and accompanying text, that
However commendable and socially desirable it might be for the School District to
provide special remedial educational programs to disadvantaged students ... or to
provide better clothing or food to enable them to more easily adjust themselves to
their environment, we find no constitutional or statutory basis upon which we can
mandate that these things be done.
Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
165. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 163986, at *36, 43-
45 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12,2000).
166. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 640, 599 S.E.2d 365, 392 (2004).
167. Id. Although it upheld the constitutional right of children from poverty
backgrounds to early childhood services, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected
Judge Manning's specific order requiring prekindergarten classes for all "at-risk" students.
Instead, the court deferred to the expertise of the legislative and executive branches in
matters of education policy and authorized them to determine the specific types of
services that should be provided to at-risk students to prepare them for school. Id. at 393-
94. After this supreme court ruling, the State expanded "More at Four," a preschool
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More recently, in December 2005, South Carolina state circuit
court Judge Thomas W. Cooper, Jr. held that poverty directly causes
lower student achievement and that the state constitution imposes an
obligation on the State "to create an educational system that
overcomes.., the effects of poverty."' 68 Because the state defendants
have not provided early childhood intervention programs, the court
declared that they "have failed in their constitutional responsibility to
provide an opportunity" for a "minimally adequate" education.'69
The court then ordered "early childhood intervention at the pre-
kindergarten level and continuing through at least grade three" to
minimize "the impact and the effect of poverty on the educational
abilities and achievements" of children from poverty backgrounds.17 °
IV. "MEANINGFUL" EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
A. The Conceptual Framework
Implementation of Brown's vision of equal educational
opportunity has been a major, sustained focus of governmental policy
for the past half century; the discussion in the previous Part has
demonstrated, however, that actual progress toward this goal has
been inconsistent and incomplete. Many have despaired that more
than half a century after the historic Brown decision, increasing
numbers of black and white children attend segregated schools, and
program geared to low-income students, which the legislature had initiated in 2001 in
response to Judge Manning's original order. This pre-K program, which had been serving
about one thousand students in its first year, was serving over sixteen thousand by the
2005-06 school year. OFFICE OF SCH. READINESS, N.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., MORE AT FOUR PRE-KINDERGARTEN PROGRAM: PROGRESS REPORT TO THE
NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1 (2006), available at http://www.governor.
state.nc.us/Office/Education/-pdf/MAFFeb2006LegislativeReport.pdf.
168. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 31-0169, slip op. at 157 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pi.
Dec. 29, 2005), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/sc/Abbeville%2OTrial%
20Court%200rder%2012-29-05.pdf.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 161. In Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997), at the remedy stage of
the litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court "identified early childhood education as an
essential educational program for children in the [low-wealth urban districts]" and found
that "[i]ntensive pre-school and all-day kindergarten enrichment program[s are necessary]
to reverse the educational disadvantage these children start out with." Id. at 436.
Concluding that the legislature had made inadequate provision for preschool services, the
court later directed the State's education commissioner to require the thirty urban
"Abbott" districts to provide half-day preschool for their three- and four-year-olds and
ordered the State to provide adequate funding to support these preschool programs. Id. at
463-64.
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the gap between achievement levels of white students and black and
Latino students seems to be narrowing only slightly, if at all.171
Although Brown's vision has been imperfectly implemented at
best, this momentous decision has led to the most serious and
sustained commitment to equal educational opportunity in America's
political and legal history.172 The clearest reflection of this ongoing
egalitarian dynamic is the fact that, as the federal courts' commitment
to active implementation of educational equity began to wane,
Congress, the state legislatures, and the state courts picked up the
baton and developed important new egalitarian initiatives. The state
legislatures, in adopting standards-based reforms, and Congress, in
enacting NCLB, have now established as the core of state and federal
educational policy throughout the United States the stunning
proposition that all children can learn and all children must become
proficient in meeting challenging state academic standards by a date
certain.
A key question that immediately must be asked in regard to this
extraordinary egalitarian commitment that has been adopted as
mandatory national policy is whether it can, in fact, be achieved.
Proficiency for all by 2014 is a radical call for equality of result that
breaches the normal boundaries of America's political culture, and is
a goal that is, in any event, unattainable at least within the
unreasonably brief time period that Congress has established.173 No
171. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text. For perspectives on "Brown at 50,"
see generally Special Issue, Brown Plus Fifty, 107 TCHRS. C. REC. 343 (2005); Special
Issue, Brown Plus Fifty (2), 107 TCHRS. C. REC. 1905 (2005); Symposium, Brown@50, 47
How. L. REV. 1 (2003-2004); Special Issue, Brown v. Board of Education, 8 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 141 (2006); Arthur Chaskalson, Brown v. Board of Education: 50 Years Later,
36 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 503 (2005); Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education,
Footnote 11 and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 297 (2005); Symposium, 50
Years of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537 (2005).
172. See, e.g., Charles Vert Willie & Sarah Susannah Willie, Black, White and Brown:
The Transformation of Public Education in America, 107 TCHRS. C. REc. 475, 490-91
(2005) (specifying dramatic educational and economic advances of African-Americans
since Brown). Note also, the major changes in public attitudes on egalitarian issues during
this Brown era. "In 1942 only 2 percent of southern whites (and 40 percent of northern
whites) believed blacks and whites should attend the same schools. By the mid-1990s, 87
percent of Americans approved of the Brown decision." Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Fall
and Rise of School Segregation, AM. PROSPECr, May 21, 2001, at 41, 41, available at
http://www.prospect.org/printlV12/9/kahlenberg-r.html.
173. See, e.g., Robert Linn, Improving the Accountability Provisions of NCLB 2-3
(Nov. 1, 2006), http://devweb.tc.columbia:edu/manager/symposium/Files/97_Linn-l[1].l.
06.pdf (stating that the demand for adequate yearly progress leading to full proficiency by
2014 asks all schools to do what no school has ever done); Richard Rothstein et al.,




one seriously expects that in the next seven years the legacies of
poverty and racism will be totally overcome and all students in the
United States will be achieving at high academic levels. Senator
Edward M. Kennedy, one of the architects of the law, recently
acknowledged that "the idea of 100 percent is, in any legislation, not
achievable.' 174 But, as Senator Lamar Alexander noted, Americans
don't want politicians to lower standards,'75 so no one in Washington
is pressing now to modify the 2014 mandatory compliance date.
Proficiency for all does, however, serve an important
inspirational purpose in expressing a serious national commitment to
substantially furthering the education of all students, and especially of
blacks, Latinos, students with disabilities, and low-income students
whose needs have been neglected in the past. It is a rallying cry that
says we must overcome the impediments of poverty and racism and
seriously pursue equity in education. Stated in these terms, the
inspirational impetus of "proficiency for all by 2014" can be retained
and actually realized if the commitment to achieve unprecedented
educational results for low-income, disabled, and minority students is
converted to a serious commitment to actually implement Brown's
vision of equal educational opportunity within the next few years.
This rare opportunity created by strong bipartisan support at
both the state and national levels for pursuing thoroughgoing equity
in education must be seized. To do so, the proficiency for all by 2014
goal should be modified before it is undermined by a cynical aura of
impossibility. If "proficiency for all" is recast as actual achievement
of Brown's vision of equal educational opportunity by 2014, then the
focus can be on determining what that vision truly means and how it
can actually be realized. The history of the implementation of the
Brown vision as discussed in the previous Part of this Article indicates
that substantial progress can be made and has been made when
concrete steps are taken to provide "meaningful" opportunities to all
students. What is needed to fully realize the Brown vision at this
point, then, is to identify and emphasize the strands of meaningful
educational opportunity that have been developed by the courts,
Congress, and other national and state institutions in the past, and to
mold them into a concept of "meaningful educational opportunity"
Symposium%2011-14-06.pdf ("No goal can simultaneously be challenging to and
achievable by all students across the entire achievement distribution ... but this is what
NCLB requires.").
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that can give focus, direction, and coherence to egalitarian policies in
education for the future.
The importance of the concept of "meaningful" educational
opportunity stems from the fact that "equal educational opportunity"
is, if left undefined, an inspiring, yet ultimately elusive, term. Equality
of educational opportunity has often been analogized to providing all
individuals an equal start for the competitive race that is life. As
President Lyndon Johnson graphically put it:
You do not take a person who, for years has been hobbled
by chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a
race, and then say you are free to compete with all the others,
and still just believe that you have been completely fair. Thus,
it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our
citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates. 176
But attempts to ensure that all of our citizens have an ability "to walk
through those gates" involve complex decisions regarding what
compensatory measures we should take, who will be the beneficiaries
of these measures, and how we should assess the degree of equity
achieved. 17 7 Furthermore, equalizing rights in one area may have a
negative effect on rights in other areas, and an equal distribution of a
particular resource may have widely different utility impacts for
different individuals.
178
In short, then, for "equal educational opportunity" to have
practical significance it must be given an explicit definition and
concrete content. 179  This is why the courts, the Congress, and the
176. LYNDON JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY
1963-1969, at 166 (1971); see also JOHN ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 2 (1998)
("[T]here is, in the notion of equality of opportunity, a 'before' and an 'after': before the
competition starts, opportunities must be equalized, by social intervention if need be, but
after it begins, individuals are on their own.").
177. See, e.g., ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY
IN SCHOOL FINANCE: CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS
4-5 (1984) (describing the myriad forms that concepts of equity in the field of education
finance can take); ROEMER, supra note 176, at 6 (discussing the complexities of
distinguishing levels of effort among individuals coming from differing backgrounds and
circumstances); James Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity, in
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: A HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH 3, 3-16
(LaMar P. Miller & Edmund W. Gordon eds., 1974) (setting forth five different definitions
of equal educational opportunity).
178. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 12-30 (1996).
179. Looking at the "elusiveness" of equality from another perspective, it has been said
that "equality" basically consists of treating "like things alike," but determining what
things are "alike" is the critical question since categories of morally alike objects do not
exist in nature; moral likeness exists only when people define categories. Joseph Tussman
& Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 345-46
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state legislatures have made their greatest strides toward
implementing the Brown vision when they have defined exactly what
it means in particular contexts. The Supreme Court was most
effective in implementing equal educational opportunity when it
adopted as a clear goal the dismantling of de jure segregation in
Southern schools and insisted on concrete desegregation plans that
"promise[] realistically to work now."'18 Similarly, equal educational
opportunity for English language learners got its greatest boost when
the Supreme Court insisted that educational services provided to
them be "meaningful," and Congress, the lower federal courts, and
the Department of Education then articulated in very precise terms
the types of services that would meet that requirement.' The long
history of neglect of children with disabilities ended when Congress
specified in clear terms the types of special education and related
services that would be provided to meet the individual needs of each
of these children.
Despite the vagueness of the overarching term "education
adequacy" that has come to describe the state court litigations that
seek basic quality educational services for all children, these cases
have been able to substantially equalize education financing in many
states 82 and to promote educational reforms that have raised student
(1949); see also Peter Westin, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547
(1982) (arguing that the notion of equality is tautological because "it tells us to treat like
people alike; but when we ask who 'like people' are, we are told they are 'people who
should be treated alike' "). The most effective way to approach issues of equality is,
therefore, to specify precisely what equality means and what it requires in particular
contexts. This is the essence of the concept of "meaningful" educational opportunity
being espoused in the main text.
180. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
181. Specifically, in response to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), Congress
increased by tenfold the funding available under the Bilingual Education Act, Pub. L. No.
93-380, § 105, 88 Stat. 484, 503-04 (1974), and expanded its definitions to emphasize
bilingual, bicultural programs. See also Rachel Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal
Intervention in Bilingual Education, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1257-68 (1988) (providing a
history of federal intervention on bilingual educational issues). Also, in response to Lau,
the federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare enacted a set of regulations
which came to be known as "the Lau remedies," which required a school district to
provide a remedial plan whenever it had twenty or more students of the same language
group identified as having a primary or home language other than English. See
BILINGUAL EDUCATION: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL POLICY xii-xiii, 213-21 (Keith
A. Baker & Adriana A. de Kanter eds., 1983).
182. See, e.g., William N. Evans et al., The Impact of Court-Mandated Finance Reform,
in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY, supra note 148, at 72, 77 (study of 10,000 school districts
over twenty-year period found that court-ordered reform reduces disparities by "leveling
up" and increases overall spending on education); Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years
After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism,
32 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 175, 190 (1998) (finding that changes in the level of inequality
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achievement'83 because they focus on the specific resources that are
needed for a basic quality education. The New York Court of
Appeals understood this point when it specifically held in Campaign
for Fiscal Equity v. State that the state constitution required that each
child be provided the opportunity for a "meaningful" high school
education that included certain "essential" resources such as qualified
teachers, small class sizes, and books and other instrumentalities of
learning, 8" and that children must be taught the specific skills that will
prepare them to function productively as civic participants capable of
voting and serving on juries."'
B. Relationship to NCLB
In order to realize Brown's vision of equal educational
opportunity, what is needed at this point is the formulation of a clear
concept of what constitutes a "meaningful" education opportunity,
that is, the educational essentials, the particular resources, practices,
programs, and services that are required to provide real
opportunities, especially for children from poverty backgrounds. We
have learned a great deal in the past fifty years about the necessary
and feasible elements of educational opportunity, and it is now time
to assemble those elements into a coherent legal concept of
"meaningful educational opportunity." This concept might then be
incorporated into a legal argument in an education adequacy or equal
protection case or into an appropriate state or federal statutory
context.
Since NCLB is the focal point of current national policy on
educational opportunity, an exploration of the relationship between
among school districts resulting from fiscal equity litigations were sustained and relatively
robust).
183. See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
184. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 333-36 (N.Y. 2003);
see also Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove, 176 S.W.3d 746, 787 (Tex. 2005) ("Districts satisfy this
constitutional obligation when they provide all of their students with a meaningful
opportunity to acquire the essential knowledge and skills reflected in ... curriculum
requirements."); Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 481 (N.J. 1998) ("The use of content and
performance standards embodied the accepted definition of a thorough and efficient
education, i.e., to prepare all students with a meaningful opportunity to participate in their
community." (emphasis added)).
185. CFE H, 801 N.E.2d at 331; see also DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 744-47
(Ohio 1997) (requiring legislature to ensure an appropriate "student-teacher ratio ... and
sufficient computers" as well as "facilities in good repair and the supplies, materials, and
funds necessary to maintain these facilities in a safe manner"); Campbell County Sch. Dist.
v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (stating that a "quality education" includes
"small schools, small class size, low student/teacher ratios, textbooks, low student/personal
computer ratios" and more).
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the concept of meaningful educational opportunity and the purposes
and requirements of that federal statute will provide an appropriate
context for developing, applying, and illustrating the argument being
advanced here. The legislative history of the NCLB provides a good
starting point for this exploration.
In various statutes it enacted regarding funding for students from
economically disadvantaged backgrounds since the early 1990s,
Congress has increasingly articulated clear goals and expectations
concerning the broad needs of these children for in-school and out-of-
school services. For example, the national goals for the year 2000
endorsed by Congress as part of the Goals 2000: Educate America
Act'86 included such specific "school readiness" goals as ensuring that
"all children will have access to high-quality and developmentally
appropriate preschool programs that help prepare children for
school";187 and that
children will receive the nutrition, physical activity experiences,
and health care needed to arrive at school with healthy minds
and bodies, and to maintain the mental alertness necessary to
be prepared to learn, and the number of low-birthweight babies
will be significantly reduced through enhanced prenatal health
systems.
188
Further, it included student achievement goals such as:
all students will leave grades 4, 8, and 12 having demonstrated
competency over challenging subject matter including English,
mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and government,
economics, arts, history, and geography, and every school in
America will ensure that all students learn to use their minds
well, so that they may be prepared for responsible citizenship,
further learning, and productive employment in our Nation's
modern economy.
189
Although these goals clearly have not been achieved, the "Statement
of Purpose" in the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act drew on this
history in expanding the definition of equal educational opportunity
186. Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 129
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-6804 (2000)).
187. 20 U.S.C. § 5812(1)(B)(i). The bipartisan drafting committee that produced the
original version of Goals 2000 had agreed that school readiness had to be the number one
goal and that this goal could not be achieved without the extensive inputs listed in the text.
CHRISTOPHER T. CROSS, POLITICAL EDUCATION: NATIONAL POLICY COMES OF AGE
95-96 (2004).
188. 20 U.S.C. § 5812(1)(B)(iii).
189. Id. § 5812(3)(A).
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to specify that "[t]he purpose of this title is to ensure that all children
have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality
education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging state
academic achievement standards and state academic assessments."' 19°
The predecessor statute, the Improving America's Schools Act of
1994,191 had utilized the phrase "fair and equal" educational
opportunity,9 2 and this phrase was repeated in the original House and
Senate versions of the NCLB.'93 The Senate version also had a list of
specific programs, strategies, conditions, and educational essentials
that expanded on the specifications of the predecessor statutes.
These included, inter alia,
(8) providing children an enriched and accelerated educational
program, including the use of schoolwide programs or
additional services that increase the amount and quality of
instructional time;
(9) promoting schoolwide reform and ensuring access of
children to effective instructional strategies and challenging,
scientifically-based academic content;
(10) significantly elevating the quality of instruction by
providing staff in participating schools with substantial
opportunities for professional development;
(11) coordinating services under all parts of this title with each
other, with other educational services, and to the extent
feasible, with other agencies providing services to youth,
children, and families;
(12) affording parents substantial and meaningful opportunities
to participate in the education of their children.'94
This detailed delineation was omitted from the final version of the
NCLB, but importantly, the term "significant" modifying
"opportunity to obtain a high quality education" was substituted in its
place.'95 "Significant" educational opportunity under the Act can
therefore be taken to mean the type of concrete and comprehensive
190. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II 2002) (emphasis added).
191. Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 1001(a)(1), 108 Stat. 3519, 3519 (1994) (amended by 20
U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II 2002)).
192. Id.
193. See H.R. REP. No. 107-334, at 691-92 n.10 (2001) (Conf. Rep.).
194. Id. at 692.
195. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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educational opportunities that had been listed in the original Senate
version. 1
96
The addition of the word "significant" to the purposes clause of
the Act focuses attention on the need to approach equal educational
opportunity in a concrete manner. "Significant" is a synonym for
"meaningful."'" Although reference to "significant" or "meaningful"
educational opportunity in an introductory purposes clause does not
constitute a statutory mandate, it does provide guidance for
interpreting the Act, and, in a more general analytic sense, for
approaching the reauthorization of the Act, which is due in 2007.
Many commentators and educators have pointed out that although
the Act's goals are exceptional and many of its innovations, like the
disaggregation of output data by ethnic, racial, and income groups,
are highly constructive, a number of its major aspects require serious
reconsideration. 9 ' As discussed above, it is also clear that its core
mandate and expectation, i.e., that all children will be proficient in
challenging state standards by 2014, cannot actually be met.'99
This being the case, in order to maximize student proficiency and
minimize achievement gaps, Congress should emphasize the first part
of the NCLB purposes clause for the near future and revise the Act to
196. Cf. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 340 (1999 & Supp. 2006) ("A court may consider the
history of a statute, in an attempt to determine the intention of the legislature in enacting
it... [including] the history of the proceedings attending its actual passage ....").
197. The prime dictionary definition of "significant" is "[h]aving or expressing a
meaning; meaningful." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1268 (3d ed.
1997).
198. See, e.g., MELISSA LAZARIN, NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, IMPROVING
ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS IN THE NO
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 3 (2006) (urging the need to reconsider provisions regarding
English language learners and offering proposals); MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA
WOLFF, CAMPAIGN FOR EDUC. EQUITY, OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS: APPLYING LESSONS
FROM THE EDUCATION ADEQUACY MOVEMENT TO REFORM THE No CHILD LEFT
BEHIND ACT 2 (2006), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource center/
OpportunityKnocks.pdf (stating that NCLB lacks requirements for sufficient federal or
state funding to accomplish its purposes); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the
No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 934 (2004) (arguing that permitting
states to set their own proficiency standards will lead to a "race to the bottom" and
undermine basic purposes of the Act); Barnett Berry et al., Ctr. for Teacher Quality, No
Child Left Behind and the 'Highly Qualified' Teacher: The Promise and the Possibilities 1
(2006), available at http://devweb.tc.columbia.edu/manager/symposium/Files/103-Berry-
NCLB_HQT_CEPOct2_2006.pdf (concluding that NCLB's current requirements will not
actually lead to "high-quality teachers" in poverty schools); Richard C. Elmore, The
Problem of Capacity in the (Re)Design of Educational Accountability Systems 3 (Oct.
2006), available at http://devweb.tc.columbia.edu/manager/symposium/Files/95_Elmore
CapacityPaper_10-5.pdf (stating that NCLB's sanction provisions undermine school-based
capacity-building).
199. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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ensure an achievable goal, i.e., 100% meaningful opportunity for all
children by 2014, rather than the impossible goal of 100% proficiency
by that time. Drawing upon the legislative history of the Act, as well
as the experiences of the state courts in the education adequacy
litigations, Congress should define specific 100% meaningful
opportunity expectations. These should require the states to have in
place by 2014 certain programs and services that are critically
necessary for children's educational progress such as early childhood
and health programs for all children from poverty backgrounds, as
well as truly qualified teachers and sufficient books, computers,
laboratories, and other instrumentalities of learning. The NCLB
should require states to ensure the availability of additional programs
and services as needed to provide meaningful opportunities to all of
their children in accordance with local needs,2" since federal
regulations cannot properly or effectively dictate all aspects of local
educational programs.2 °'
The suggestion here is not to eliminate the prominence of
outcome accountability measures in NCLB, but to moderate them
and achieve a reasonable balance with appropriate input measures.
As "meaningful opportunity" is realized over the next seven years,
Congress can then assess the achievement gains actually made in light
of these opportunity gains and with those data determine challenging,
but realistic, targets for achieving full proficiency thereafter.2 °
C. Specific Elements
In addition to guiding future directions for NCLB, the concept of
"meaningful" educational opportunity should be the main
interpretative mechanism that Congress, the courts, and the state
legislatures use in approaching educational equity issues. What an
emphasis on "meaningful" educational opportunity adds to the equity
equation is the understanding that to achieve, or even approach,
equity, children must be provided a range of programs and services
that respond directly to their educational needs and that will
reasonably allow them to develop their educational potential. This is
200. States would be expected to provide a combination of particular in-school and
out-of-school services that are most relevant for their students' needs. See supra notes
177-85 and accompanying text.
201. See ELMORE, supra note 198, at 3-4 (noting that the federal government lacks the
necessary resources to independently enact its policy goals).
202. See MICHAEL A. REBELL ET AL., MOVING EVERY CHILD AHEAD: ENSURING
"MEANINGFUL" EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL CHILDREN (forthcoming 2007)
(offering detailed suggestions for reorienting specific provisions of the NCLB to promote
meaningful educational opportunity and reasonable outcome measures in this manner).
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especially true for children in high-poverty schools who have the
greatest need for meaningful opportunities.
203
Specifically, to formulate coherent concepts of meaningful
educational opportunity, Congress, the courts, and the state
legislatures need to concentrate on policies in three areas. The first is
establishing clear goals and expectations that can reasonably be met.
Second is adopting a "comprehensive" approach to educational
opportunity that confronts the realities of concentrated poverty and
provides the range of in-school and out-of-school services that will
allow all students to actually meet the goals and expectations. Third
is the need to ensure that all necessary resources are actually
provided, but to do so in a feasible, cost-effective way.
1. Goals and Expectations
The many state courts that have considered in depth what
students need to obtain a constitutionally adequate education have, in
fact, arrived at a general consensus regarding the definition of a basic
quality education. This state court consensus indicates that a basic
quality education is one that provides students with the essential skills
they need to function productively as capable voters, jurors, and civic
participants in a democratic society and to compete effectively in the
twenty-first century global economy.
The types of knowledge and skills that students need to be
effective citizens and workers, as articulated in the state court
adequacy cases, are:
0 sufficient ability to read, write and speak the English
language and sufficient knowledge of fundamental
mathematics and physical science to enable them to
function in a complex and rapidly changing society;
203. This concept of "meaningful" educational opportunity is somewhat comparable to
the theory of "minimum welfare" articulated by Professor Frank Michelman in Foreword:
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9
(1969). Michelman sought to explain the Warren Court's equal protection jurisprudence
through this paradigm, which held that government has an obligation to provide certain
specific basic services and treatments to the poor, rather than abstract equal treatment.
Michelman's theory was articulated in terms of "minimums." If we are to take seriously
the national commitment to proficiency for all students in the foreseeable future, however,
more than minimum levels of services must be provided.
204. For a more detailed discussion of the consensus state court definition of a basic
quality education, see generally MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R. WOLFF, CAMPAIGN
FOR EDUC. EQUITY, LITIGATION AND EDUCATION REFORM: THE HISTORY AND THE
PROMISE OF THE EDUCATION ADEQUACY MOVEMENT 10-11 (2006), available at
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource-center/adequacy-history.pdf; REBELL & WOLFF,
supra note 198.
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* sufficient fundamental knowledge of social studies, that is,
geography, history, and basic economic and political
systems, to enable them to make informed choices with
regard to issues that affect them personally or affect their
communities, states and nation;
* sufficient intellectual tools to evaluate complex issues and
sufficient social and communication skills to work well with
others and communicate ideas to a group; and sufficient
academic and vocational skills to enable them to compete
on an equal basis with others in further formal education or
gainful employment in contemporary society. °5
If the true goals and expectations for a quality basic education
are defined in these broad terms, then students should be assessed in
terms of this range of expectations (and not just in core reading and
math skills), proficiency should be defined in accordance with this full
range of knowledge and skills, and resources need to be provided in
amounts that will allow students to successfully meet expectations in
all of these areas.
2. Comprehensive Services
As discussed in Part II, the state court adequacy litigations have
clearly established that "money matters" and that providing
appropriate resources substantially improves student achievement.2'
The consensus definition emerging from the state adequacy cases also
identified the following as the essential school-based resources
students need to acquire the basic knowledge and skills described
above:
* effective teachers, principals, and other personnel;
* appropriate class sizes;
* adequate school facilities;
* a full platform of services including guidance services and
necessary tutoring and additional time on task for students
from poverty backgrounds;
* appropriate programs and services for English language
learners and students with disabilities;
* instrumentalities of learning, including, but not limited to,
up-to-date textbooks, libraries, laboratories, and computers;
and
205. REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 198, at 8-9.
206. See supra Part II.B.
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* a safe, orderly learning environment.2 17
As part of the Goals 2000: Educate America Act 20 8 enacted in
1994, Congress articulated the concept of "opportunity to learn
standards" ("OTL"), voluntary national school delivery standards
that states could choose to adopt, or state OTL standards that states
could develop in conjunction with their own content and student
performance standards.29 The statute defined the OTL concept as
"the criteria for, and the basis of, assessing the sufficiency or quality
of the resources, practices, and conditions necessary at each level of
the education system ... to provide all students with the opportunity
to learn the material in voluntary national content standards or State
content standards. 2 1 ° For a short period of time, intense controversy
developed concerning the meaning of the vaguely defined OTL
concept and the extent to which it would be a precursor of
overbearing federal control of education.' Whether or not feasible
OTL standards could have been developed remains unknown since
the OTL requirements were promptly revoked by Congress after the
Republicans took control later that year, and these requirements
never took effect.212
The concept of meaningful educational opportunity being
advanced in this Article differs from the OTL standards in that it
relies on a concrete list of essential resources based on extensive
educational research and practice that has been subject to grueling
analysis in a wide variety of separate state cases. As such, this
concept has emerged from actual empirical experience in the states,
207. Id.; cf. S. 2828, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 2178, 109th Cong. (2006) ("Student Bill
of Rights" Act introduced by Senators Dodd, Kennedy, and others which defines the
"fundamentals of educational opportunity" in terms of highly qualified teachers,
principals, and academic support personnel, rigorous academic standards, small class sizes,
textbooks, instructional materials and supplies, school facilities and computer technology,
and quality guidance counseling).
208. Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-6084 (1994)); see supra notes 184-87 and
accompanying text.
209. 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-02 (1994), repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996).
210. 20 U.S.C. § 5802 (1994).
211. See, e.g., Gretchen Guiton & Jeannie Oakes, Opportunity To Learn and
Conceptions of Educational Equality, 17 EDUC. EVAL. & POL'Y ANALYSIS 323,323 (1995)
(discussing various theories of equality that might be reflected in OTL standards); Andrew
C. Porter, The Uses and Misuses of Opportunity-To-Learn Standards, EDUC.
RESEARCHER, Jan./Feb. 1995, at 21, 22 (describing difficulties of using OTL standards for
accountability purposes).
212. See PATRICK J. MCGUINN, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 1965-2005, at 109 (2006).
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rather than as abstract federal mandates developed by regulators or
advisory panels. Moreover, "meaningful educational opportunity"
calls for categories of specific resources but omits the difficult to
define "conditions and practices" that created most of the
controversy around OTL standards.2"3
If the states are to implement earnestly the policy of providing
meaningful educational opportunity to all that is basic to NCLB and
most state standard-based reform initiatives, the need for essential
resources is virtually incontrovertible. The federal law should require
states to provide adequate resources in each of the essential areas, but
determining specifically what are "effective" teachers, "appropriate"
class sizes, "adequate" facilities, and so on should be left to the states.
Such a federal requirement would likely lead to extensive and
beneficial debates and discussions within each state as to the level and
combination of services that are needed to provide a "meaningful
educational opportunity." Moreover, if, over time, student progress
toward proficiency is not sufficient, further consideration of the types
and level of resources and of states' practices in providing those that
need to be provided would likely ensue.
The "money matters" debate and the continuing analysis of the
impact of socioeconomic disadvantages on student achievement first
raised by the Coleman report, have clearly established that in
addition to providing necessary in-school resources, states and
localities need to ameliorate a variety of out-of-school conditions if
students from poverty backgrounds are to reach proficient levels of
academic achievement. A revised NCLB should, therefore, also
include a requirement that school districts with high concentrations of
students from poverty backgrounds who are not meeting annual
progress requirements should work with public agencies and local
community-based organizations to identify and provide an
appropriate range of out-of-school services to counter the detrimental
effects of poverty. In addition to high-quality early childhood
education programs, such services are likely to include health and
nutrition services, a range of after-school and summer academic
enrichment programs, family and community support for academic
achievement, access to the arts, and cultural and civic expression.
213. See, e.g., Lorraine M. McDonnell, Opportunity To Learn as a Research Concept
and a Policy Instrument, 17 EDUC. EVAL. & POL'Y ANALYSIS 305, 307-311 (1995)
(describing technical difficulties of using opportunity to learn as a policy tool, such as the




Examples of promising school/community collaborations to
provide such comprehensive services already exist. In Portland,
Oregon, for instance, the Schools Uniting Neighborhoods ("SUN")
Initiative,2"4 joins a range of public and private entities in an extensive
collaboration with over fifty schools in six districts to develop
community schools that extend the school day and serve as
"community hubs" in their neighborhoods." 5  SUN community
schools link with other community institutions, such as the libraries,
neighborhood health clinics, community organizations, and area
churches and businesses to pool and coordinate resources.1 6
The SUN Initiative has a unique methodology: the community
school selects a nonprofit lead agency to act as managing partner for
the effort. 217 "Jointly they hire SUN Site Managers to help build and
bring networks of services, classes and volunteers together to benefit
youth and the community. '218 A major goal is to provide enrichment
and recreational opportunities that will connect the curriculum of the
school and after-school activities for the students.219 The "managers
coordinate these services and make sure they link to the academic
school day., 220  They also provide programs for parents and other
adults in the community. Through the use of an advisory committee,
the schools tailor their events, classes, services, and activities to the
needs of the local community.221
Similarly, school officials, community agencies, and political
leaders in Rochester, New York, recently came together to develop a
214. Schools Uniting Neighborhoods Mission and Goals, http://www.sunschools.org/
mission.shtml (last visited May 3, 2007); see also Martin J. Blank, How Community
Schools Make a Difference, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, May 2004, at 62,64.
215. SUN EVALUATION WORKGROUP, SCHOOLS UNITING NEIGHBORHOODS:
BASELINE REPORT 4, http://www.sunschools.org/pdfbaseline-eval-rep.pdf; Sun
Community School Contacts 2006-07, http://www.sunschools.org/pdf/sunschoolscontacts.
pdf.





221. SUN EVALUATION WORKGROUP, supra note 215. Initial evaluations of the
project have indicated a range of positive results including improved academic
performance in reading and math both at the elementary and middle school levels, see
Dianne Iverson, Schools Uniting Neighborhoods: The SUN Initiative in Portland, Oregon,
in COMMUNITY SCHOOLS: A STRATEGY FOR INTEGRATING YOUTH DEVELOPMENT
AND SCHOOL REFORM, 81, 86 (Joy Dryfoos & Jane Quinn eds., 2005), and teacher
surveys indicate improvement in attendance, classroom behavior, homework completion,
and class participation, see GARY NAVE ET AL., Nw. REG'L EDUC. LAB., MULTNOMAH
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS SUN SERVICE
SYSTEM 2004-05 EVALUATION REPORT (2006).
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plan for a Rochester Children's Zone encompassing a large section of
the school district that would provide extensive, coordinated
education, health, and youth services, as well as job training and
housing assistance to their parents.22  New York State Governor
Eliot Spitzer has included a $4 million allocation in his current budget
proposal to support the Rochester plan as a pilot model that may then
be replicated in other parts of the state.223
The Rochester plan was modeled on the Harlem Children's
Zone ("HCZ") Project,224 an established program that works to
enhance the quality of life for children and families in one of New
York City's neighborhoods most devastated by poverty,
unemployment, and a paucity of public resources. The HCZ Project
takes a comprehensive approach to empowering and providing
necessary support to parents, residents, teachers, and community
members in order to create significant, positive opportunities for their
children to become healthy, productive adults.225  Through an
interrelated program of education, health, nutrition, parent
education, and early childhood support, HCZ runs fifteen community
centers that provide a comprehensive range of services to more than
13,000 children and adults, including over 8,600 at-risk children in a
sixty-block area in central Harlem.226
The services provided to the children and families within the
zone include programs to:
* provide expectant and new parents with necessary skills and
information relating to health, safety, and child
development, and support to address the needs of children
from birth to the age of three;
* stimulate four-year-old, prekindergarten children's mental
growth and learning through reading and talking;
222. IT TAKES VISION To RAISE A CHILD, ROCHESTER CHILDREN'S ZONE:
IMPROVING THE LIVES OF CHILDREN IN NORTHEAST ROCHESTER 5-6 (2007)
http://www.rcsdkl2.org/rcz/DOCS/RC2%20Community%20Plan.pdf.
223. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF THE BUDGET, DESCRIPTION OF 2007-08 NEW YORK STATE
EXECUTIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDATION FOR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION 16 (2007), http://www.budget.state.ny.us/localities/schoolaid/0708Schlaid_
exec.pdf.
224. See Children's Zone, HCZ Project & Programs; The Mission, http://www.hcz.org/
project/mission.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
225. Id.
226. See id.; HCZ Project & Programs: The Boundaries of the Zone, http://www.hcz.
org/project/boundaries.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
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" provide families and children with access to immediate
social services, including foster care prevention, domestic
violence workshops, and parenting skill classes;
* help students and parents of students with severe academic
and attendance problems;
* train young people ages eighteen to twenty-four who are
interested in making their neighborhoods safer for children
and families;
" teach youth and adult residents the necessary skills to
compete in today's increasingly competitive job market;
* promote local revitalization projects and support
neighborhood tenant and block associations;
* screen all children within the HCZ Project for asthma and
offer a holistic response including home visits and medical
support to families.227
As with essential in-school services, a general federal
requirement to implement a coordinated program of important out-
of-school services would allow for extensive state and school district
discretion in determining which out-of-school and community-based
services are most critical for meeting students' educational needs and
which methods for providing these services would be feasible and
most cost-effective.228 The anticipated public dialogue on the specific
components of a "meaningful educational opportunity" and how they
can best be provided by schools in collaboration with other agencies
would be particularly useful and advantageous in this newly
developing but critical area. As with in-school services, if over time
student progress toward proficiency is not sufficient, further
consideration of the types, amounts, and mechanisms for providing
services that are needed to meet students' needs would likely ensue. 29
If educational opportunities for low-income and minority
students are to be truly meaningful, the issue of school integration
must be put back on the table. Although providing all children a
comprehensive range of services in an effective manner will
significantly advance national educational progress, decades of
227. See Harlem Children's Zone, HCZ Project & Programs, http://www.hcz.org/
project/mission.html (last visited May 3, 2007).
228. Cf. PETER H. SCHUCK & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, TARGETING IN SOCIAL
PROGRAMS: AVOIDING BAD BETS, REMOVING BAD APPLES 116 (2006) (proposing an
analytic framework for determining "best bets" for increased social investments).
229. Extensive state-based discussion and debate of these issues may also motivate
policymakers to implement other social and economic policies that might mitigate the
effects of poverty on children in areas like housing, health insurance, and income
maintenance.
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experience have now proved that all children, minority and majority,
are better prepared for work and civic life when they have
experienced integrated education.230 In order to prepare our students
to compete effectively in the global marketplace and to function
productively as civic participants in a democratic society, ultimately,
the wisdom of Brown will have to be respected and serious pursuit of
racial integration of the schools will have to again become national
and state policy.
At some point, the manner in which the competing values of
"local control" and school desegregation were balanced by the
Supreme Court in Milliken2 31 more than three decades ago will have
to be revisited. Such a contemporary reconsideration would
recognize that, on the one hand, state standards-based reforms and
increased federal intervention into local educational affairs under the
NCLB have dramatically reduced the actual influence of local school
officials on educational policy, and that, on the other hand, a focus on
"meaningful" educational opportunity reinforces the truth of Brown's
core holding that segregation in the schools is inherently unequal. 32
230. "[M]uch of the social science research on school desegregation has been
optimistic, showing mixed test score results but a positive trend toward higher African-
American student achievement during the peak years of desegregation, as well as long-
term academic and professional gains for African-American adults who had attended
racially mixed schools." Amy Stuart Wells et al., Tackling Racial Segregation One Policy
at a Time: Why School Desegregation Only Went So Far, 107 TCHRS. C. REC. 2141, 2142
(2005). See generally Janet Ward Schofield, Review of Research on School Desegregation's
Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 597 (James A. Banks ed., 2001) (reviewing a wide array of
research on the impact of school desegregation); Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain,
Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REV. EDUC.
RES. 531 (1994) (drawing together twenty-one studies on the long-term effects of school
desegregation).
231. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see supra note 139 and accompanying
text.
232. If resource inadequacies in predominantly minority schools are corrected, and
students from poverty backgrounds receive the comprehensive range of services they need
to be ready to learn, thoroughgoing desegregation efforts in the twenty-first century may
meet less political resistance than they have in the past. See TAMAR JACOBY, SOMEONE
ELSE'S HOUSE: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED STRUGGLE FOR INTEGRATION 539 (1998)
("[I]ntegration will not work without acculturation."). Effective integration may also be
cost-effective, since serious efforts to overcome the impediments to learning in schools
with concentrated poverty (whose students currently are 80% black and Latino, see supra
text accompanying note 28) are substantially more expensive than similar educational




If all children are to actually obtain a basic quality education,
then once a determination has been made regarding the constellation
of services particular children need to obtain a meaningful
educational opportunity, those essential resources must actually be
provided. This may seem to be an elementary proposition, but the
fact is that many state education finance systems are not based on
allocating money in accordance with need, but instead subordinate
need to the availability of funding or to politically determined funding
decisions. As virtually all of the state court education finance and
education adequacy decisions have found, 33 money does matter.
Therefore, the types of remedies that have been implemented in the
state fiscal equity and educational adequacy cases, and the types of
cost studies that have been generated by them, need to become
standard operating procedures in all states. Actual provision of
essential resources also means that the type of hyperbole that
permeates the NCLB, which labels teachers with minimum
competency skills as "highly qualified, 234 and accepts minimal content
or assessment standards as constituting "proficiency," must be
rejected. 5 If it is agreed that students, and especially students from
poverty backgrounds, need effective teachers who are truly "highly
qualified" and academic standards and assessments that are truly
rigorous, full measures, not half measures, must be taken to provide
these.236
233. See supra Part II; see also text accompanying notes 20-26 (describing the
educational difficulties faced by low-income children).
234. See, e.g., BERRY ET AL., supra note 198, at 2 (noting that federal rules allow states
to label a teacher as highly qualified before finishing preparation).
235. LINN, supra note 173, at 3, 14-15 (stating that under NCLB, the notion of
proficient student achievement "is so poorly defined and varies so much from state to state
that it has become a meaningless concept"); Robert B. Schwartz, Standards, Tests and
NCLB; What Might Come Next (Nov. 13-14, 2006), available at http://devweb.tc.
columbia.edu/manager/symposium/Files/102_SchwartzSTANDARDS %20AND %20
EQUITY1.pdf (arguing that the wide variations in proficiency standards across the states
compels revisiting the question of national standards or national benchmarking of
standards).
236. The kind of efforts that must be made and that can result in recruiting and
retaining effective teachers in "hard-to-staff" schools include
a) providing adequate salaries for all teachers,
b) ensuring a critical mass of competent, dedicated peers at hard to staff schools,
c) providing substantial ongoing bonuses for highly qualified teachers willing to
make long-term commitments to teach in "hard to staff' schools,
d) assuring adequate resources, reasonable class sizes, and appropriate working
conditions in all schools,
e) ensuring effective principals and administrators,
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Clearly, if "meaningful" educational opportunity is seriously
pursued, substantial additional revenues will be needed, but the
benefits will reduce other social costs, improve productivity, and
generate economic growth. Indeed, a recent set of papers that
examined the broad range of social costs of inadequate education
concluded that the impact on the American economy in terms of lost
income, lost taxes, extra health costs, and increased crime amounts to
over $250 billion per year.237 The public has also repeatedly indicated
that it is willing to accept higher costs for public education-if the
money is spent well and truly leads to higher achievement for all
students.238
This, of course, means that accountability issues must move to
the forefront of equity discussions. A thoroughgoing focus on
accountability is precisely the direction that the state standards-based
reforms and adequacy litigations are going. Costing-out studies239 are
f) providing high-quality mentoring and professional development,
g) providing opportunities for collaboration and exercise of professional judgment,
h) eliminating rights of senior teachers to transfer in and "bump" qualified junior
teachers,
i) redefining tenure to ensure reasonable job security so long as instructional
effectiveness is maintained.
237. See THE PRICE WE PAY: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF INADEQUATE
EDUCATION, supra note 31 (calculations of economists and subject area experts of annual
dollar loss to society based on numbers of high school dropouts per year).
238. State and national polls have revealed a consistent willingness of overwhelming
majorities of the American public (59% to 75%) to pay higher taxes for education,
especially if there is a reasonable expectation that the money will be spent well. See, e.g.,
Americans Willing To Pay for Improving Schools, NPR ONLINE (1999), http://www.
npr.org/programs/specials/poll/education/education.front.html (interpreting the data from
the 1999 National Public Radio poll and stating that "[t]hree out of four Americans say
they would be willing to have their taxes raised by at least $200 a year to pay for specific
measures to improve community public schools"); Majority of Voters Indicate They Will
Vote for Candidates Who Make Education a Top Priority; Report to Reveal Mixed Support
for No Child Left Behind, EDUC. WK., Apr. 1, 2004, http://www.publiceducation.
org/doc/2004_PollPressRelease.doc (interpreting the results from Public Education
Network/Education Week Poll 2004 and stating that "[a] majority of voters (59 percent)
say they are willing to pay higher taxes to improve public education"); Lowell C. Rose &
Alec M. Gallup, 38th Annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes
Toward the Public Schools, 88 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 41, 47 (2006), available at
http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/k0609pol.htm (finding that 66% of Americans responded
affirmatively to the question, "Would you be willing to pay more taxes for funding
preschool programs for children from low-income or poverty-level households?").
239. "Costing-out" studies are analyses undertaken by education finance analysts or
economists that aim to determine objectively the amount of funding that is needed to
provide all students with a meaningful opportunity for an adequate education. For a
detailed discussion of the current state of the art regarding these studies, see generally
Michael A. Rebell, Professional Rigor, Public Engagement and Judicial Review: A
Proposal for Enhancing the Validity of Education Adequacy Studies, 109 TCHRS. C. REC.
1303 (2007), available at http://www.tc.columbia.edu/i/a/3949-profrigor.pdf.
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beginning to move from discussions of how much money is needed to
educate students from diverse backgrounds under present practices to
how much money would be needed in an environment that
emphasized best practices.2 40 Better coordination of services already
being provided by a range of governmental and private agencies can
also result in both significant cost savings and more effective support
programs.24'
"Meaningful" educational opportunity may also necessitate
confronting the accelerating trends toward widening of the income
gaps between haves and have-nots. Although a comprehensive range
of effective in-school and out-of-school programs can substantially
mitigate the detrimental impacts of poverty, if job insecurity, housing
conditions, mobility, and other poverty conditions that schools cannot
affect deteriorate, the cost of providing meaningful educational
opportunities will escalate, and the possibilities of actually achieving
the Brown vision will diminish. In other words, there is a limit to the
degree that America can reasonably expect equal educational
opportunities to compensate for the neglect of employment, housing,
and other social welfare policies.242 Accordingly, some reduction in
240. See Rebell, supra note 239 (discussing "Quality Education Model" mechanisms
for determining both the amount of money and the educational practices that will lead to
high student performance in accordance with established state standards which are being
implemented in Oregon, California, and other states). Consideration also should be given
to cost-effectiveness in the utilization of existing allocations. For example, huge and
growing amounts of money are now earmarked for teacher pension programs. These have
relatively small value in terms of attracting and retaining qualified young teachers. A
recent survey of teacher pension costs in seven states by the Commission on the Skills of
the American Workforce concluded that the average total contribution by employers and
employees was approximately 18%. Assuming this to be the average contribution
nationwide, the Commission concluded that a 6% reduction in pension contributions
would free up approximately $6.6 billion that could be used to bolster salaries of starting
and mid-level teachers. COMM. ON THE SKILLS OF THE AM. WORKFORCE, supra note 35,
at 107.
241. Some state courts have also included accountability requirements, as well as
mandates for more resources, in their orders. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
790 S.W.2d 186, 213 (Ky. 1989) ("[The] schools shall be monitored by the General
Assembly to assure that they are operated with no waste, no duplication, no
mismanagement, and no political influence"); see also infra text accompanying notes 303-
08 (discussing accountability issues in the CFE litigation).
242. See WELLS, supra note 36, at 30 (arguing the need for different supplementary
programs to equal the lives of our children outside of school). Although the present
Article is not the proper place for a full discussion of the moral dimensions of this issue,
some recognition must be given to the fact that huge gaps between the haves and the have-
nots undermine the social contract and sense of community necessary for a democracy to
function. Furthermore, there can be little doubt that those who succeed economically are
benefiting to a large degree from the "social capital" that the society has provided them,
and they therefore have a concomitant obligation to extend the benefits of that social
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the gap between haves and have-nots in American society 43 may be a
sine qua non for substantially reducing or eliminating achievement
gaps.
In sum, adoption of a "meaningful" educational opportunity
paradigm will bring together the manifold strands of equal
educational opportunity that have been developed over the past fifty
years in a coherent and effective manner. It will allow us finally and
truly to implement the vision of Brown v. Board of Education.
However, in order to actually accomplish this visionary but
achievable goal, active involvement by the courts, working in concert
with the other branches of government, must be not merely tolerated,
but welcomed. The next Part explains why.
V. THE NECESSARY ROLE OF THE COURTS
Meaningful educational opportunity for all children, as defined
in the preceding Part, can be achieved-but not without the
continued and expanded involvement of the courts in educational
reform cases. Contemporary understandings of equal educational
opportunity were largely created by Brown v. Board of Education
and shaped by the series of federal desegregation and related
education cases that followed in its wake. The state court fiscal
equity and education adequacy litigations have maintained and
magnified this egalitarian momentum as the federal courts' active
pursuit of school desegregation has abated, and they have begun to
define in concrete terms the elements of meaningful educational
opportunity.
capital to those who have been less advantaged. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1971) (arguing that differentials in economic rewards are morally justified
only when the economic incentives ultimately result in benefits to the most disadvantaged
in the society).
243. The growing gap between haves and have-nots in America is illustrated by the fact
that from 1973 to 2000, the average real income of the bottom 90% of American taxpayers
declined by 7%, while the income of the top 1% rose by 148%. Heather Boushey &
Christian E. Weller, What the Numbers Tell Us, in INEQUALITY MATTERS: THE
GROWING ECONOMIC DIVIDE IN AMERICA AND ITS POISONOUS CONSEQUENCES 27,31
(James Lardner & David A. Smith eds., 2005). Another ominous reflection of these
trends is the fact that whereas in 1965, a corporate CEO's income was twenty-six times the
average wage, in 2003 it was 185 times the average wage. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL.,
THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2004/2005, at 7. The American dream of rapid
upward mobility may be more myth than reality. Income inequality is more extreme
today in America than in most other developed countries, and the chances of someone
from a family in the bottom quarter rising to the top quarter, which was 23% in 1973, was
only 10% in 1998. Boushey & Weller, supra, at 34.
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As noted above, constitutional challenges to the inequitable and
inadequate funding of public education have been litigated in the
state courts of forty-five of the fifty states, and the courts have been
upholding plaintiffs' claims at an accelerating rate, with plaintiffs
prevailing in almost 75% of education adequacy cases decided since
1989.24  The court decrees in these cases have led to notable
successes. In Kentucky, the courts' intervention has resulted in
dramatic reductions in spending disparities among school districts,245
the redesign and reform of the entire education system, and a
significant increase in that State's student achievement scores.246 In
Massachusetts, enactment of the Education Reform Act of 1993 in
response to that State's adequacy litigation has also sharply reduced
the funding gaps between rich and poor school districts,247 and the
percentage of students achieving proficiency on state tests has risen
dramatically. 48  As a result of litigation in Arizona, facilities
standards have been aligned with the State's learning standards, and
all school buildings are being brought up to the new code.249
In some states, the mere filing of a complaint has led to
significant reforms.2 0 Even where plaintiffs have not prevailed, the
244. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
245. Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform
in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 485 (1999) (noting that immediate legislative response
to the Rose decision resulted in greater income distribution to low-wealth districts).
246. Ky. DEP'T OF EDUC., RESULTS MATTER: A DECADE OF DIFFERENCE IN
KENTUCKY'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1990-2000, at 72-87 (2000), available at http://www.kde.
state.ky.us/NR/rdonlyres/EFOA1C1D-F709-44D3-8CC2-74E113172B51/0/10thAnniversary
Report.pdf.
247. Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 WL 877984, at * 5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr.
26, 2004) (expounding on the key changes of the Education Reform Act), rev'd on other
grounds, 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005); Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134,
1141-44 (Mass. 2005) (summarizing the background and effect of the Education Reform
Act).
248. For example, on the fourth-grade English language arts examinations the
percentage of students meeting proficiency rose from 20% in 1998, to 55% in 2003; on the
tenth-grade math examination the percentage meeting proficiency over that five-year
period rose from 25% to 50%. RENNIE CTR. FOR EDUC. RESEARCH & POLICY,
REACHING CAPACITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE STATE ROLE IN IMPROVING Low
PERFORMING SCHOOLS AND DISTRICTS 9 (2005), http://www.renniecenter.org/research-
docs/0504_ReachingCapacity.pdf.
249. Molly A. Hunter, Building on Judicial Intervention: The Redesign of School
Facilities Funding in Arizona, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 173, 173 (2005) (stating that lawsuits
regarding state funding methods resulted in a new capital funding system).
250. In Iowa, within a year after a coalition of 160 school districts and individuals filed
suit challenging the school funding system, the legislature passed a bill replacing the
current local-option sales tax for schools with a pool of sales-tax money that would be
distributed on a per pupil basis, and the suit was withdrawn. Lynn Okamoto, House OKs
Bill on School Tax Pool, DES MOINES REG., Apr. 24, 2003, at 4B; Dale Wetzel, School
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very fact that there has been litigation often puts the issue of finance
reform at the top of the legislative agenda, in some cases prompting
significant legislative changes." The courts' involvement in this area
has also spurred the widespread use in over thirty states of costing-
out studies, which have substantially improved the methodologies
used to determine objectively the amount of resources needed to
provide an adequate education. 2
Despite the dramatic impact of their interventions and a record
of notable successes, the state courts' widespread involvement in
educational adequacy litigations has not consistently realized its
potential for promoting positive educational reform. Although
legislatures and governors in some states have responded promptly
and positively to judicial decrees, 253 in other states there has been
excessive delay and resistance to court orders,24 sometimes combined
Lawsuit Ends, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 11, 2006, available at http://www.bismarcktribune.
com/articles/2006/01/11/news/topnews/108347.txt; Molly A. Hunter, Access Network, Iowa
Suit Seeks Equitable and Adequate School Funding (Dec. 5, 2002), http://www.
schoolfunding.info/states/ia/12-5-021itigation.php3.
251. G. Alan Hickrod et al., The Effect of Constitutional Litigation on Education
Finance: A Preliminary Analysis, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 180, 207-08 (1992) (concluding that
reductions in inequity occur in states experiencing education finance litigations, whether
plaintiffs prevail or not, compared to states in which there has been no litigation); see also
William S. Koski & Henry M. Levin, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: What Have We
Learned?, 102 TCHRS. C. REC. 480, 506 (2000) ("Surely every state legislature is aware of
the possibility of educational finance litigation and many have likely taken prophylactic
measures.").
252. For a history, overview, and analysis of the use of costing-out studies, see
generally Rebell, supra note 239 (providing a detailed analysis of costing-out studies). ,
253. In Vermont, for example, within months of the court's decision the legislature
enacted a dramatic set of sweeping education finance reforms. See Michael A. Rebell &
Jeffrey Metzler, Rapid Response, Radical Reform: The Story of School Finance Litigation
in Vermont, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 167, 167 (2002) (providing a description of the enacting of
the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1997 in Vermont). In Wyoming, the Joint
Appropriations Committee of the legislature promptly commissioned and implemented a
cost study according to the court's order in Campbell County School District v. State, 907
P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995). As noted above, the Kentucky legislature promptly responded to
the court's decision in Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), by
enacting a thoroughgoing reform scheme that dramatically exceeded the court's
requirements. See Hunter, supra note 245, at 485 (discussing the state's response to the
Rose decision).
254. In New York, for example, the legislature failed to act by the July 30, 2004,
deadline established by the New York State Court of Appeals in Campaign for Fiscal
Equity v. State (CFE I), 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003), causing plaintiffs to seek and obtain
a further remedial order from the trial court, which was upheld in modified form by the
Court of Appeals. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE I1), 861 N.E.2d 50, 61
(N.Y. 2006) (modifying the order and affirming the lower court, as modified). In New
Hampshire, the state legislature and governor reacted to the court's ruling in Claremont
School District v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997), by proposing a number of
constitutional amendments limiting the court's power and affirming the state's
2007] MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY 1529
with threats to revoke the courts' authority to hear these cases.255 In
two instances, state supreme courts, after initially confronting
opposition to their orders, retreated from the fray and terminated the
cases before an appropriate remedy had been fully effectuated. 56
A. The Outdated Charges of "Judicial Activism"
One of the major reasons for delay and resistance to
constitutional mandates in these cases is that there is an "absence of a
legitimate legal discourse 257 that straightforwardly supports the
judicial interventions. Opponents attack the legitimacy of the courts'
involvement, as well as judicial competence to undertake these tasks,
unconstitutional school funding system. After the amendments failed to pass, the
legislature created a funding system that did not address many of the tax issues raised by
the lawsuit, and which was based upon the results of a cost study that had been
substantially manipulated to lower costs. Their reaction led to further legal challenges.
See generally DREW DUNPHY, MOVING MOUNTAINS IN THE GRANITE STATE:
REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE AND DEFINING ADEQUACY IN NEW HAMPSHIRE (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (describing the effects of the ruling).
255. In Kansas, for example, after the state supreme court responded to the
legislature's failure to comply fully with its initial order with a definitive requirement for a
substantial funding increase by a date certain, leaders of the state senate informed the
governor that they would comply only if the education finance reform bill was
accompanied by a constitutional amendment revoking the court's jurisdiction over
education finance issues in the future. See John Hanna, Showdown Looms as Republicans
Plan Amendment, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, June 17, 2005, available at http://www2.ljworld.
com/news/2005/jun/17/showdownlooms/?politics; John Milburn, Senate Pushes for
Constitutional Amendment, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, June 29, 2005, available at
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2005/jun/29/senate-pushes/. Within weeks, this resistance
was overcome and a bill enacted in accordance with the court's order. Montoy v. State,
120 P.3d 306, 308 (Kan. 2005) (holding the State's funding system to be unconstitutional,
resulting in quick legislative action).
256. In both Alabama and Ohio, state supreme court judges are elected, and the
education adequacy case became a major issue in the judicial elections. New judges who
were critical of the court's adequacy ruling replaced members of the majority who had
voted for the education finance reforms. In Alabama, the result was a sua sponte move by
the state supreme court in 2002 to reopen Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Spiegelman, 713
So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1997), a case it had decided for the plaintiffs in 1997. After soliciting
arguments from the two sides, the court dismissed the case, citing a violation of separation
of powers. Access Network, Alabama Supreme Court Dismisses Funding Case It
Previously Affirmed (May 31, 2002), http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/al/5-31-O2ACE
dismissed.php3. In Ohio, despite repeated rulings by the state supreme court that the
state's school funding system was unconstitutional in DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 1), 677
N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997), DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 11), 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000), and
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II1), 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001), the legislature failed to
enact sufficient reforms. Once the majority on the supreme court shifted, the court agreed
to a request by the state to end the compliance process, effectively putting an end to the
case. Access Network, Ohio (May 31, 2002), http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/oh/lit_
oh.php3.
257. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 115, at 338.
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claiming that courts are usurping legislative and executive
authority.58 These charges of judicial usurpation, which originated
with political opposition to the desegregation decrees of the federal
courts in the 1960s and 1970s and have been repeated as a mantra
ever since, have little doctrinal or empirical substance.
In the initial days of judicial enforcement of desegregation
decrees, there was a wide-ranging academic debate regarding the
phenomenon of "judicial activism." The courts' forays into
policymaking in areas that traditionally were considered in the
legislative or executive domain were repeatedly attacked as violating
traditional separation of powers precepts. 259 Defenders of the courts'
new role argued that the courts were merely adapting traditional
concepts of judicial review and their obligation to enforce
constitutional rights to the needs of a complex administrative state26°
and that "no branch could correctly claim to be the sole
representative of the people. Representation was to be by each of
them, according to the functions they performed. 2 61 One of the most
influential perspectives on judicial activism during this period was
that of Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes who related the
258. See, e.g., Alfred A. Lindseth, The Legal Backdrop to Adequacy, in COURTING
FAILURE, supra note 9, at 33, 36 ("Ignoring separation of powers considerations, [some
state courts] have approached adequacy lawsuits in such a way as to substantially usurp
the power of the legislature"); see also Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of
the Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2446-50 (2004) (discussing the courts' encroachment on
traditional notions of separation of powers); Kenneth W. Starr, The Uncertain Future of
Adequacy Remedies, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF
EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 307, 310 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007)
(advocating "judicial humility" in cases involving educational policy issues); Joshua Dunn
& Martha Derthick, Adequacy Litigation and the Separation of Powers, in SCHOOL
MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra, at 322,
334-39 (expressing skepticism regarding judicial competence to fashion remedies in
educational adequacy litigations).
259. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 390 (1997) (discussing judicial
takeover of policymaking); Nathan Glazer, Toward an Imperial Judiciary, in THE
AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH-1976, at 104, 114 (Nathan Glazer & Irving Kristol eds.,
1975) (predicting a "continued and powerfully intrusive role for the courts that they
cannot avoid"); see also PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
WARREN COURT 21-50 (1970) (discussing the interaction of the three branches of
government).
260. See, e.g., Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional
Litigation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271, 271-75 (1981); Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-17 (1979).
261. Edward Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 376
(1976); see also RICHARD NEELY, HOW COURTS GOVERN AMERICA, at xi (1981) (stating
that "American courts ... are the central institution in the United States which makes
American democracy work").
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growth of judicial involvement in the reform of public institutions
since Brown to the broader expansion of governmental activities in
the welfare state era.262
The courts' institutional capacity to carry out successfully these
broad new remedial tasks was also widely questioned. Critics claimed
that courts are incapable of obtaining sufficient social science data
and that judges generally are unable fully to understand and digest
the data that are obtained. 263 They also contended that judges lack
coherent guidelines for resolving policy conflicts and that, therefore,
they fail to undertake a comprehensive policy review or to consider
the overall implications and consequences of their orders.
264
Defenders of this new remedial role retorted that the courts' lack of
established organizational mechanisms is a virtue, not a vice, because
it permits a flexible response that can be tailored to the needs of the
particular situation.265 They emphasized that the courts have always
delved into complex social and economic facts2 66 and that processes of
judicial appointment or election assure that judges are "likely to have
some experience of the political process and acquaintance with a
fairly broad range of public policy problems."
2 67
In the 1980s, my colleague Arthur R. Block and I undertook two
major empirical studies to test the validity of the competing
arguments in the judicial activism debate in actual instances of
educational policymaking by courts, legislatures, and a major
administrative agency, the Office of Civil Rights in the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("OCR").2" In
regard to the separation of powers issues, we concluded that judicial
deliberations tended to be based on principled constitutional values,
262. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1288 (1976).
263. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 47-51
(1977); Eleanor P. Wolf, Social Science and the Courts: The Detroit Schools Case, 42 PUB.
INT. 102, 113-15 (1976).
264. See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 51-56; JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL
COMPULSIONS: How PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 113-14 (1989).
265. See Chayes, supra note 262, at 1309; see also Robert D. Goldstein, A Swann Song
for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 48
(1978).
266. ROSEN, supra note 121, at 6-7; see Chayes, supra note 262, at 1284.
267. Chayes, supra note 262, at 1308.
268. MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, at xi (1982); REBELL
& BLOCK, supra note 112, at 53-202. Although the core case study here involved OCR's
enforcement activities in New York City, detailed comparative perspectives were also
obtained of comparable OCR activities at the time in Chicago, Los Angeles, and
Philadelphia.
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rather than instrumental policy considerations, although in many
circumstances distinctions between "principle" and "policy" were
difficult to draw. Significantly, however, judges tended to approach
principle/policy issues in a distinctly different way: their decisions
tended to reflect a "rational-analytic" decisionmaking mode, in
contrast to the mutual adjustment processes that tend to predominate
in legislative decisionmaking, and the "pragmatic/analytic"
policymaking mode of the administrative agency.
One of the other major conclusions of our comparative empirical
studies was that the evidentiary records accumulated in the court
cases were more complete and had more influence on the actual
decisionmaking process than did the factual data obtained through
legislative hearings. The latter tended to be "window dressing"
occasions organized to justify political decisions that had already been
made. 269 Fact gathering through the administrative process proved to
be more comprehensive and more sophisticated than that of either
the courts or the legislatures, at least in this massive OCR special
investigation context, but questions arose concerning the objectivity
of the agency's use of the data since OCR tended to adopt a
"prosecutorial" stance in its approach to the evidence.
In regard to remedies, our studies concluded that judicial
remedial involvement in school district affairs was both less intrusive
and more competent than is generally assumed, largely because
school districts and a variety of experts generally participated in the
formulation of reform decrees, with the courts serving as catalysts and
mediators. OCR proved effective in administering remedial
agreements that call for immediate, statistically measurable
implementation, but in regard to the major New York City faculty
269. A comparative analysis of the factfinding capabilities of Congress and the courts
reached similar conclusions. See Neal Devins, Congressional Fact Finding and the Scope
of Judicial Review: Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1177-87 (2001); see also
Sheila Jasanoff, Judicial Fictions: The Supreme Court's Quest for Good Science, 38 SOC'Y
27, 28 (2001) ("Adversarial questioning of experts in legal proceedings has frequently
exposed hidden interests and tacit normative assumptions that are embedded in
supposedly value-neutral facts. The confrontation of lay and expert viewpoints that the
law affords has emerged as a powerful instrument for probing some of the untested
epistemological foundations of expert claims.").
270. See also JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 24 (1978) (discussing the
implications of "authorizing administrative agencies to combine investigative,
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275, 308 (1988) ("[A]n agency tends to be 'captured' over time, as interest group
demands grow increasingly asymmetrical and the agency loses outside political support
and institutional momentum.").
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desegregation agreement that called for phased-in implementation
over a number of years, the agency's "staying power" and its ability to
respond flexibly to changed circumstances was markedly less effective
than that of the courts.271
Although criticisms of particular instances of active judicial
involvement in social policymaking still resound in political debates
and in the popular press, serious academic discussion of the
"legitimacy" of the courts' enhanced role has been muted in recent
years. Chayes's contention that the courts' expanded role is a
fundamental judicial reaction to deep-rooted social and political
trends seems to be borne out by the fact that the activist stance
initiated during the Warren Court era has persisted to a large extent
through the Burger and Rehnquist 27 2 years and that conservatives no
less than liberals now tend to look to the courts routinely to remedy
legislative or executive actions of which they disapprove. 273 As Feeley
and Rubin have noted,
271. Gary Orfield, after completing a number of case studies of judicial involvement in
lengthy desegregation cases, similarly concluded that "courts have some special
strengths-removal from politics and the ability to stay with a complex issue long enough
to implement change." GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 350
(1996). Legislatures do not purport to engage in remedial oversight of the reform
processes they initiate, although oversight hearings and modification of statutory
provisions in light of events could be said to constitute analogous functions. We did not,
therefore, attempt to extend our comparative analysis of remedial oversight capabilities to
the legislative domain.
272. Indeed, if "judicial activism" is defined in terms of declaring an act of the
legislature unconstitutional, the Rehnquist Court was the most activist in American
history. Until 1991, the United States Supreme Court struck down an average of about
one congressional statute every two years. Since 1994, the Court has struck down sixty-
four congressional provisions, or about six per year. This invalidated legislation has
involved social security, church and state, campaign finance, and a host of other major
social policy issues. Paul Gewirtz & Chad Goldner, Op-Ed., So Who Are the Activists?,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19. Gewirtz and Goldner also point out that the Court's
most conservative members tended to be the most "activist": Justice Thomas voted to
strike down 65.63% of these congressional provisions, Justice Scalia 56.25%, in contrast to
only 39.06% for Justice Ginsberg and 28.13% for Justice Breyer. Id.; see also Barry
Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review,
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1261-63 (2004) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court is one of the
"most activist in history").
273. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003) (declaring unconstitutional a
college's policy of granting racial preferences in its admissions policy); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (declaring unconstitutional the Violence Against
Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free
School Zones Act); Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. Hsu, 85 F.3d 839, 872-73 (2d
Cir. 1996) (allowing a school religious club to require its officers to be Christians); see also
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 440 (2004) (reiterating the power of federal courts to
enforce broad-ranging consent decrees in institutional reform litigations). But see Grutter
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[Judges] are part of the modern administrative state ... and
they fulfill their role within that context. Under certain
circumstances that role involves public policy making; as our
state has become increasingly administrative and managerial,
judicial policy making has become both more necessary for
judges to produce effects and more legitimate as a general
model of governmental action.274
The irony of the fact that some political commentators and
academics continue to invoke anachronistic "judicial activism"
phrases is that, while these pundits persist in arguing that the courts'
new role is usurping legislative powers, Congress and the state
legislatures have themselves asked the courts to take on more of
these policymaking activities by passing regulatory statutes that
directly or implicitly call for expanded judicial review. A prime
example is the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, in
which Congress set forth a detailed set of substantive and procedural
rights and explicitly established a new area of court jurisdiction for
individual suits, regardless of the amount in controversy. 275 The
significance of this trend of the creation of new statutory rights that
explicitly or implicitly expand the enforcement responsibilities of the
courts has been recognized even by critics of judicial involvement in
social policymaking.276 Under these circumstances, as Chayes aptly
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding a policy of considering race as a valid
factor in promoting diversity in law school admissions).
274. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 115, at 344.
275. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (2000); see also Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.) (requiring states to adopt federal standards to obtain federal funds). The
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act has reportedly spawned foster care litigation
in at least thirty-four states. See NAT'L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW, FOSTER CARE REFORM
LITIGATION DOCKET (2006), http://www.youthlaw.org/fileadmin/ncyl/youthlaw/
publications/fcrldocket06.pdf. Additionally, the Clean Air Act of 1970 establishes a right
to healthy air and explicitly authorizes citizen suits. See Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a) (2000).
276. See, e.g., Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE:
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 17-18 (2003). Although
recognizing the significance of this trend, Sandler and Schoenbrod are highly critical of its
implications:
By extrapolating [the Brown precedent] to a whole host of newly minted rights,
[Congress has] created a new governmental lineup in which one set of officials at
the federal level largely escapes accountability for the costs of the laws they pass
and another set of officials at the state and local levels lacks the power to balance
the costs of implementing the federal statutory rights against other competing
priorities. -
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put it, we should "concentrate not on turning the clock back (or off),
but on improving the performance of public law litigation.
12 7
The public also has come to look to the courts for an assessment
and resolution of highly controverted issues involving the intersection
between science and public policy.278 For example, the volatile issue
of whether "intelligent design" is a valid scientific theory that should
be taught to high school biology students has apparently been
resolved by the recent decision of a federal district court judge in
Pennsylvania. 279 The judge's declaration that "after a six week trial
that spanned twenty-one days and included countless hours of
detailed expert witness presentations, the Court is confident that no
other tribunal in the United States is in a better position than are we
Id. at 33. But cf. Mark Tushnet, Sir, Yes, Sir: The Courts, Congress and Structural
Injunctions, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 190 (2003) (arguing that Sandier and
Schoenbrod's criticism of the courts is misguided since the political branches, through
clear democratic processes, authorized and required them to enforce the affirmative rights
at issue).
277. Chayes, supra note 262, at 1313. In one area, that of prison litigations, Congress
has acted affirmatively to limit judicial involvement. Thus, the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), among other things, limits the type of relief that courts can
provide, makes any relief granted subject to termination after two years, and abridges the
courts' authority to appoint a special master. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified
as amended at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). Although the PLRA has not totally
eliminated prison reform litigation, see, e.g., Wilson v. Vannatta, 291 F. Supp. 2d 811 (N.D.
Ind. 2003) (holding that inmate's complaint was sufficient to state a claim that deprivation
of food, exercise, and medication violated his constitutional rights), it has substantially
decreased their incidence and impact, see William C. Collins, Bumps in the Road to the
Courthouse: The Supreme Court and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 24 PACE L. REV.
651, 669-70 (2004) (illustrating that the rate of prison civil rights filings declined from 29.3
per 1,000 prisoners in 1981 to 11.4 in 2001).
278. Researchers also appear to be looking to the courts as a source for effective
resolution of major social science issues because the courts' discovery processes are
sometimes more comprehensive than data gathering techniques available to professionals
in the field. See Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin, The Economics of Education on
Judgment Day, 28 J. EDUC. FIN. 183 (2002) ("Both in terms of resources and access to
documents, data, and personnel, the Court's investigation far exceeded that typically made
by researchers."). Belfield and Levin also opined that:
Courts can navigate well through (disputed) social science arguments regarding
educational outcomes, educational inputs (the education production function), and
the deployment of teacher inputs. Moreover, rulings themselves can offer useful
guidance to researchers on what fields of inquiry are important for resolving key
public policy concerns, on what empirical evidence and which methodologies are
deemed most valid, as well as indicate new areas for academic interest.
Id. at 24-25.
279. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 745 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
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to traipse into this controversial area,"' was widely accepted by
national commentators 281 and local public officials282 alike.
Concerns regarding the courts' capacity to engage in
sophisticated fact gathering and remedial processes have also been
muted by the findings of empirical investigations into what courts
actually do in these cases. One of the major shortcomings of the
judicial activism debate was its focus on the limitations of the judicial
branch, while ignoring the comparable institutional shortcomings of
the legislative and the executive branches. For example, Donald
Horowitz, one of the foremost critics of the courts' new role,
catalogued a bevy of examples of alleged judicial incompetence,
ranging from receiving information in a skewed and halting fashion to
failing to understand the social context and potential unintended
consequences of the cases before them.283 As Professor Neil Komesar
has forcefully pointed out, however, Horowitz's critique, like that of
many of his current disciples, was unreasonably one-sided:
Horowitz's study can do no more than force us to accept the
reality of judicial imperfection. By its own terms it is not
comparative, and that is far more damning than Horowitz
supposes. All societal decision makers are highly imperfect.
Were Horowitz to turn his critical eye to administrative
agencies or legislatures he would no doubt find problems with
expertise, access to information, characterization of issues, and
follow-up. Careful studies would undoubtedly reveal important
instances of awkwardness, error and deleterious effect.2"
280. Id. at 735. The judge also remarked that "[tihose who disagree with our holding
will likely mark it as the product of an activist judge. If so, they will have erred as this is
manifestly not an activist court." Id. at 765.
281. "In this case [the courtroom] proved to be an ideal forum.... The trial also
allowed the lawyers to act as proxies for the rest of us, and ask of scientists questions that
we'd probably be too embarrassed to ask ourselves. In a courtroom, you must lay an
intellectual foundation in order to earn a line of questioning-and so the lawyers stripped
matters neatly back to the first principles of science." Margaret Talbot, Darwin in the
Dock: Intelligent Design Has Its Day in Court, NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 66, 68.
282. One of the Dover school board members remarked that,
This is a judge making a ruling on a case where both sides got to present their side,
fully. This should bring some closure at least for our community. I'm sure there
are many other communities throughout the United States that will be waiting for
this verdict with great interest.
James Anthony Whitson, The Dover (PA) Evolution Case: A True Win for Education?,
TCHRS. C. REc., Jan. 4, 2006 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
283. HOROWITZ, supra note 263, at 255-74.
284. Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a
Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REv. 657, 698 (1988) [hereinafter Komesar, A
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In light of the reality that the courts have proved highly effective
in comprehending and applying social science information and in
formulating and monitoring remedies in complex institutional reform
litigations, Michael Heise's contention that litigation focused on
student academic achievement is beyond the reach of law, litigation,
and court opinion285 has no factual basis. Precisely because the
challenge of meeting the needs of students in schools with high
concentrations of poverty and substantially narrowing or eliminating
the achievement gaps, involves "[c]hallenges such as household
stability, poverty, and adverse peer-cohort effects," '286  a
comprehensive range of "meaningful" educational opportunities must
be made available to these students, and meaningful educational
opportunity will in many circumstances only be effectuated if it is
established and enforced as a principled priority by the courts.
Interestingly, although charges of "judicial usurpation" of
legislative and executive prerogatives still abound, the claim from the
1970s that judges were not capable of understanding social science
facts or overseeing reform processes has largely abated, presumably
because of the overwhelming evidence of comparative judicial
competence in these areas. The main concerns with judicial
interventions into educational affairs in the state adequacy cases
today seem focused on the fact that courts tend not to follow up on
their orders to ensure that the funds are, in fact, being allocated in
ways that will benefit the poor and minority children in whose names
most of these cases had been brought.
Thus, the courts are criticized for failing to "requir[e] the
efficient or cost-effective use of funds,"287 for assuming that "school
districts [are] organized in a way that ensures that they are making
Job for the Judges]. Komesar elaborates on his comparative analytic approach in Neil K.
Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional
Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984). For more background on comparative
institutional analysis, see generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Edwin L.
Rubin, The New Legal Process: The Synthesis of Discourse and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1427-28 (1996) (calling for a new synthesis of
process, law and economics, and critical legal theories into a "new realm of comparative
legal analysis" that explores institutional capacities under particular circumstances).
285. Michael Heise, Litigated Learning, the Limits of Law, and the Urban School
Challenge, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2007). Heise's general position regarding the
courts' inability to deal effectively with "teaching and learning activities," id., is belied by
the state courts' substantial success in bolstering state standards-based reform efforts and
inducing legislatures, executive agencies, and school boards to fairly and effectively
implement these reforms.
286. Id. at 1421.
287. Lindseth, supra note 258, at 65.
2007] 1537
1538 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85
productive use of the money they now receive from taxpayers or of
the additional money they would receive if adequacy campaigns
prevailed," '288 and for not requiring that the extra resources they
mandate "be targeted at the students in need of it most, such as low
income children.
2 89
A significant aspect of these criticisms is that, as Komesar
pointed out,290 none of these critics have even claimed that the other
branches of government have been more effective than the courts in
ensuring the productive use of educational funding, or in targeting the
funds in a manner that would benefit students most in need. On the
contrary, it is precisely because the legislative and executive branches
have failed to target funds in an equitable and effective manner2 91 that
constitutional rights have been violated and courts have felt
compelled to take jurisdiction of these cases. Legislatures in most
states are heavily dominated by suburban majorities,292 and therefore
the legislative process, left to its own natural political propensities,
will tend to create education finance systems that strongly disfavor
poor urban and rural school systems.293
288. Evers & Clopton, supra note 9, at 104.
289. David Hinojosa, How Adequacy Litigation Shortchanges High-Poverty Children
and Schools, Address at the North Carolina Law Review Symposium, High-Poverty
Schooling in America: Lessons in Second-Class Citizenship (Oct. 13, 2006); accord
Marguerite Roza & Paul T. Hill, How Can Anyone Say What's Adequate if Nobody Knows
How Money Is Spent Now?, in COURTING FAILURE, supra note 9, at 235, 252 ("The
lawsuits leave the districts' decision-making processes intact, making it likely that new
funds will follow the same patterns as current funds do.").
290. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
291. The critics of judicial intervention themselves readily admit that "the
dissatisfaction with the current performance of schools relates directly to decisions the
political branches have made in the past." Koret Task Force on K-12 Education, Funding
for Performance, in COURTING FAILURE, supra note 9, at 329, 346. Often courts are
blamed for mismanagement or waste that occurs with funds flowing from their orders,
even though the executive or legislative branch had total control of the activities at issue.
For example, after the New Jersey Supreme Court had ordered substantial funding for
school construction in Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 473-74 (N.J. 1998), a
school construction oversight authority, set up by the governor in 2000, caused major
delays and was then replaced by the New Jersey School Construction Corporation, set up
by another governor in 2002. The chairman of that corporation then resigned in 2005
amid accusations of mismanagement, conflicts of interest, and abuse of taxpayer dollars.
Tom Hester, Legislators Back School Plan but Worry over the Red Tape, STAR-LEDGER
(N.J.), July 31, 2002, at 17; David Kocieniewski, Head of New Jersey's School Construction
Agency Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at B8.
292. Marilyn Gittell, The Politics of Equity in Urban School Reform, in BRINGING
EQUITY BACK: RESEARCH FOR A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 16,
16 (Janice Petrovich & Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2005).
293. See id. at 16-17; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of
School Finance: A Cautionary Note, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 37, 43 (1996) ("[I]f the
representatives from wealthier school districts can form a majority without the inclusion of
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B. The Need for a "Colloquy" Among the Branches
The fact is that providing meaningful educational opportunities
to eliminate or substantially narrow achievement gaps is, as indicated
in the previous sections of this Article, a daunting task that no
governmental entity has been able to solve. Clearly, if Brown's vision
of equal educational opportunity is actually to be realized, it will
require the sustained commitment of all three branches of
government, at both the federal and state levels, working
collaboratively in dramatic new ways. In the complex administrative
environment in which we now live, neither courts, legislatures, nor
administrative agencies operating alone can successfully resolve
major social problems. Successful policymaking in a complex
regulatory environment requires continuing interchanges and often
continuing involvement of all three branches of government.
Effective implementation of meaningful educational opportunity has,
in fact, generally occurred in the past when the judicial, legislative,
and executive branches worked collaboratively, as in Congress's
advancing the desegregation remedies formulated by the courts
through the ESEA and Title VI statutes, and in Congress's enactment
of the IDEA294 and the executive branch's issuance of the Lau
remedies in response to the declaration of egalitarian values by the
courts.295
In considering the role of the courts in education finance and
education adequacy cases, the approach should be, not repetition of
abstract rhetoric about judicial "usurpation," but consideration from
a comparative institutional perspective of what functions courts can
best undertake, in collaboration with the other branches, to promote
effective school reform practices.296 What is needed, therefore, is not
representatives from poorer school districts, the latter will be unable to logroll for their
agenda.").
294. Congress's enactment of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, the
predecessor to the IDEA, was a direct response to the decisions in two federal district
court cases which had applied the Brown precedent of equal educational opportunity to
students with disabilities: Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1972), and Mills v. Board of Education,
348 F. Supp. 866, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1972). See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 n.2,
192-94, 194 n.18 (1982). Congress enacted the sweeping handicapped rights statute before
the Supreme Court had considered the issue of constitutional rights in this area.
295. See supra notes 134-35, 181 and accompanying text.
296. Komesar has stated this proposition in more skeptical terms: "The judicial role is
defined by asking when a constrained and fragile judiciary should substitute its decisions
for a sometimes badly malfunctioning political process." Komesar, A Job for the Judges,
supra note 284, at 659.
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a competition but a "colloquy ' among the branches to get this
demanding job done. Such a colloquy should build on the realization
that each of the three branches has specific institutional strengths and
weaknesses in regard to social policymaking and remedial problem-
solving. The focus, therefore, should be on how the strengths of each
of the branches can best be jointly brought to bear on solving critical
social problems.
Although a full consideration of precisely which functions can
best be undertaken by the courts, by legislatures, and by executive
agencies will require substantially more dialogue and consideration
than can be dealt with in this Article, a few preliminary illustrative
points about the courts' comparative institutional strengths are
apparent. First, declaring and insisting on the vindication of
constitutional rights is the courts' prime constitutional responsibility.
The courts' role in articulating constitutional principles and affirming
the right of all children to an adequate and meaningful educational
opportunity is of paramount importance. The dynamic advance of
values of equal educational opportunity that has been at the core of
political and legal activity for the past fifty years would not have
occurred without the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown,
nor would education finance reform or the insistence that poor and
minority children be provided the resources needed for a meaningful
educational opportunity have occurred without the intervention of
the state courts. Full realization of these values also will not come
about without the continued active involvement of the courts.
Second, precisely because state legislatures and executive
agencies overseeing school districts have at times failed to ensure the
effective use of education funds, and the targeting of resources to the
students with greatest needs, courts need to become more-not less-
active at the remedy stage of equal opportunity and adequacy
litigations. Virtually all economists and fiscal policy analysts agree
that money matters in education-if the money is spent well. 98 The
public has expressed a willingness to pay higher taxes to support
education reform-if the money is used well.299  Ensuring
accountability and the effective use of funds is a function for which
the courts are particularly well suited. State courts have, in fact,
297. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 70-71,206, 240
(2d ed. 1986). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance?
Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045 (1991)
(discussing "colloquy" between state courts and state legislatures on statutory issues).
298. See supra Part II.
299. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 851540
MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY
proved to be highly adept at promoting and reviewing cost studies
that provide proper parameters for adequate funding.3°"
This does not mean that courts should undertake cost studies or
devise the econometric methodologies that should be used in such
studies. These functions obviously are better undertaken by the other
branches. Rather, judicial review has become important in the
costing-out process, by (a) inducing legislatures to utilize transparent,
professional methodologies for determining education funding levels
in place of the secret back-room political deals that have dominated
education finance decisionmaking in the past, and (b) providing a
neutral forum for reviewing the validity of legislative or executive
actions when allegations of manipulation or misuse of cost study data
arise.310 Courts also can have an important role in encouraging states
and school districts to develop and adopt promising new
methodologies for linking cost studies with analyses of best practices
through "quality education models" and other such mechanisms.
3°2
Courts similarly are well equipped to review and enforce
effective accountability measures in order to ensure that education
funds stemming from adequacy cases are used in a cost-efficient,
productive, and targeted manner. Developments in the compliance
stage of the CFE litigation illustrate why. Both the plaintiffs and the
defendant governor had asked the courts to insist that the New York
City Department of Education, which is expected to receive at least
$2 billion of court-ordered funds, develop a comprehensive plan
detailing how these funds would be spent, and that the Department
issue annual reports that would specify how the funds had in fact been
disbursed and what results had been achieved.3"3 Although a panel of
referees and the lower court had endorsed this request,3°4 it was
ultimately denied by the Court of Appeals based on an abstract
separation of powers concern that the courts' involvement in this case
must be terminated as soon as possible.3 5 The court took this stance,
even though the assistant solicitor general at oral argument had
informed the court that the state had joined the plaintiffs in
300. See Rebell, supra note 239.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Report and Recommendations of the Judicial Referees 47-48, Campaign for
Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2004) ("The parties have agreed on
several enhancements to the current system of accountability that we believe are
appropriate").
304. CFE Ill, 861 N.E.2d at 57.
305. Id. at 58 ("[Iln fashioning specific remedies for constitutional violations, we must
avoid intrusion on the primary domain of another branch of government.").
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requesting a judicial accountability order because political realities
had precluded the legislature from taking effective action of this
type.
306
Ironically, opponents of judicial involvement in education
adequacy cases rebuke the courts for mandating sizeable increases in
education funding without taking any steps to ensure that the money
is actually spent effectively3 7 but at the same time argue that the
courts must terminate their involvement in these litigations as soon as
possible.3 8 The fact is that courts have a unique capacity for ensuring
that effective accountability measures are put into effect, not by
micromanaging the day-to-day operations of a school system, but by
making sure that legislatures, state education departments, and school
districts do their jobs well.
CONCLUSION
Our nation has embarked on an unprecedented undertaking in
committing as a matter of firm national policy to ensure that all
children are educated to high levels. This goal-which is critical to
the nation's economic competitiveness and to the effective
functioning of our democratic political system-can only be
accomplished by focusing not on abstract concepts, but on specific
understandings of which programs, activities, or services are
"meaningful" with regard to getting the job done.
The history of the federal courts' implementation of Brown's
desegregation mandate; Congress's enactment of Title I of the
306. Denise A. Hartman, Assistant Solicitor Gen. for the State of N.Y., Oral Argument
at the New York Court of Appeals (Oct. 10, 2006). The Court of Appeals' refusal to insist
on a workable accountability mechanism in CFE III was especially puzzling since the court
had in CFE II included a specific requirement to "ensure a system of accountability to
measure whether the reforms actually provide the opportunity for a sound basic
education." Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE 11), 801 N.E.2d 326, 348 (N.Y.
2003). The parties' insistence on open effective planning and reporting by the school
district was an attempt to enforce this judicial requirement which the CFE III court
inexplicably then abandoned. In Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 WL 877984, at
*145 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 26,2004), motion for further relief denied sub nom. Hancock v.
Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005), the trial judge, citing CFE If as
precedent, issued an even more specific recommendation regarding accountability
strictures when she ruled that the State must "determine the costs associated with
measures, to be carried out by the department working with the local school district
administrations, that will provide meaningful improvement in the capacity of these local
districts to carry out an effective implementation of the necessary educational program."
307. See, e.g., Koret Task Force on K-12 Education, supra note 291, at 340 (accusing
courts of "almost always turn[ing] to calls for increased spending on schools" without
providing strong accountability systems).
308. See SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 276, at 223-25.
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Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, the Bilingual Education Act and the Individuals with
Disabilities Act; as well as the state courts' involvement in the fiscal
equity and education adequacy litigations has shown that progress
toward equal educational opportunity occurs when concrete steps are
taken to provide "meaningful" opportunities to all students. This
Article has attempted, therefore, to identify and emphasize the
strands of meaningful educational opportunity that have been
developed by the courts, Congress, and other national and state
institutions in the past and to mold them into a concept of
"meaningful educational opportunity" that can give focus, direction,
and coherence to egalitarian policies in education for the future.
To formulate coherent concepts of meaningful educational
opportunity, Congress, the courts, and the state legislatures need to
concentrate on policies in three areas. The first is establishing clear
goals and expectations that can be met-and taking every feasible
step to actually meet them. Second is adopting a "comprehensive"
approach to educational opportunity that confronts the realities of
concentrated poverty and provides the range of in-school and out-of-
school services that will allow all students to actually meet those goals
and expectations. Third is the need to ensure that all necessary
resources are actually provided, but to do so in a feasible cost-
effective way.
Although NCLB's mandate that 100% proficiency be achieved
by 2014 is unrealistic and unattainable, the provision of 100%
meaningful educational opportunity-a goal that would finally realize
the fifty-year-old vision of Brown v. Board of Education-is
attainable by 2014. This challenge can only be met, however, if all
branches of government at both the federal and state levels are
committed to the task. Each branch of government has a significant,
complementary role to play. The courts have a critical role in
ensuring and enforcing the rights of the most vulnerable and
powerless, and in overseeing long-range remedial processes to make
sure that promised reforms are implemented and that they are
implemented well. The role of the courts, therefore, is critical if all
children are indeed to receive the meaningful educational
opportunities that are at the heart of the vision of Brown and at the
core of the American dream.
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